Five months have passed since the US military intervention in Venezuela, under the three-phase plan of stabilization, recovery, and transition. However, as time goes on, it is becoming increasingly important to discuss accountability and transparency, both in Caracas and in Washington. There are several areas of concern where transparent information management and effective accountability mechanisms are urgently needed.
Management of Gold and Oil Revenues
Since Chavismo came to power, Venezuela has been characterized by opacity in its economic management, with oil being a significant source of corruption, compounded in the last 10 years by gold mining. Widespread corruption is one of the causes of the complex humanitarian emergency that has led to mass migration and a growing decline in the population’s quality of life. The opacity in the management of oil revenues has not disappeared since the Trump administration announced it would control the proceeds from oil sales. On the other hand, much of the gold extracted in the Orinoco Mining Arc is exploited in a context of environmental destruction, affecting indigenous communities and involving illegal armed groups from both Venezuela and Colombia, making it blood gold.
The commercialization of this material is restricted in international markets; however, it is unknown how the resources from oil and gold mining are being managed and how they are benefiting the population. It is necessary to establish accountability mechanisms regarding the resources from oil and gold mining and how these resources are being channeled to benefit the population. The profiles of the “new” officials appointed by Rodríguez, most of whom have histories of inefficiency and corruption, must also be considered.
The scope of the figures presented by Trump
A few days after the incursion into Venezuelan territory, President Trump announced that he had recovered 50 million barrels of oil. Although it may seem like a significant figure, it corresponds to the total oil consumption of the U.S. in two and a half days. Similarly, a few days after the chargé d’affaires arrived, she announced the arrival of six tons of medicine. Again, the figure seems important, but according to humanitarian workers consulted, that amount can cover a hospital’s supplies for a month. It is also urgent to establish control mechanisms over the figures presented by the Trump administration to ensure transparency and accountability.
Myths about the amnesty law and prisoner releases
There is no doubt that the release of a person subjected to arbitrary detention for a long period should be celebrated. However, the number of releases has been slow, insignificant, selective, revictimizing, and used for political purposes to maintain the subjugation of the population. The structures of repression remain unchanged; no one has been investigated for the harm inflicted on the population targeted by political persecution; the figures for releases from prison and those granted amnesty are unverifiable; and no national or international human rights organization has indicated that the problem has been mitigated or lessened. AlertaVenezuela, along with Espacio Público and the Human Rights Center of the Andrés Bello Catholic University, has twice attempted to access public information regarding the application of the amnesty law, but the General Prosecutor has refused to provide the requested information based on technicalities.
Barriers to Transition
Issues such as the repeal of laws that restrict civic space and curtail freedom of expression, the reopening of the media, guaranteeing the safe return of exiles, the selection of independent officials in the justice system, citizen power and electoral power, and the recognition of political parties must be included, with measurable indicators, in the three-phase plan presented by Secretary of State Rubio. It is not enough to set a date for an election if the apparatus that undermines guarantees for a democratic process that allows for a credible and competitive election is not dismantled beforehand.
Legal Certainty
Various U.S. spokespeople have associated legal certainty with the possibility of providing a reliable environment for foreign investment, based on predictability. It is worth remembering that, in the 1990s, Venezuela was the country where the World Bank developed its first judicial reform project. The project was based on the same logic of legal certainty for foreign investment, initially focusing only on civil and commercial courts, without considering that this legal certainty was equally important for other actors in the economic sphere, such as labor unions, small-scale farmers, and even actors in the criminal justice system. Therefore, it was necessary for judicial reform to comprehensively encompass all areas of justice, in strict adherence to the Constitution and the laws, favoring the judicial, prosecutorial, and police careers as the foundation of an independent justice system that guarantees the rights of all. This project achieved significant progress in the stability and independence of judges until Hugo Chávez came to power, when the process was reversed. Legal certainty associated only with foreign investment is insufficient and should not be supported by a stabilization and recovery plan.
The Presence of Armed Groups
In Venezuela, irregular armed groups, both Venezuelan and from Colombia, have a presence with territorial control and governance capacity in at least 22 of the country’s 24 states, from where they control, among other things, gasoline and drug trafficking, human trafficking, and illegal gold mining. During his visit to Venezuela, U.S. Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum stated that the entry of companies with extensive experience into the Venezuelan mining sector “will displace that illegal activity.” This optimistic view seems unfounded, considering that, regarding the irregular armed groups from Colombia, they have over 60 years of experience in armed conflict, and not only have they not been displaced from the territories under their control, but they have caused the largest civilian displacement crisis in the world.
The three-phase plan must be based on reliable technical information about the presence and dynamics of illegal armed groups in Venezuela if it hopes that the stabilization and recovery phases prior to the transition will contribute to creating the necessary space for governance, both for foreign investment and for the stability of a democratic transition process.
Without transparent accountability mechanisms, the proposed three phases risk ultimately endorsing the current situation, frustrating the population’s expectations for a genuine transition to democracy.