A couple of weeks ago, we raised an alert about the spread of the “hostage diplomacy” phenomenon in Venezuela, fearing that states would support this practice regardless of the consequences for the hundreds of political prisoners—national and foreign—in the country, and to the detriment of new victims under the revolving door dynamic—some detainees leave, others enter—implemented by the Maduro regime. The implementation of hostage diplomacy with other states reveals that arbitrary detentions have ceased to be a mere political cost and have become a potential political benefit, which is unquestionable in the case of Venezuela.
Nowadays, this concern has intensified with the latest prisoner exchange between the United States and Venezuela, with the intervention of El Salvador. The exchange involves 252 Venezuelans deported from the United States in March 2025, held in the CECOT prison for alleged ties to the Tren de Aragua organization. President Bukele stated that the detainees face charges of homicide, robbery, and rape, although no evidence was presented. It is a fact that they were removed from the United States without due process. Meanwhile, Venezuela released 10 Americans and a number of Venezuelan prisoners yet to be determined. One of the most significant criticisms is the lack of transparency surrounding the process: the legal details of each case, including who is on the list of those released, are unknown. This secrecy fuels mistrust about the negotiations and their supposed outcomes, as well as a well-founded fear about the fate of those repatriated by Maduro, who has a history of repression against Venezuelan migrants, a risk that only increases in the cases of people who have requested asylum due to political persecution.
Generally speaking, two levels of analysis operate regarding this large-scale exchange. On the one hand, a more basic analysis limits itself to applauding the releases and arguing that the Maduro government lost by not receiving recognition or any type of concessions, or at least not the kind that would be most important, such as the issue of oil licenses and sanctions. On the other hand, a more elaborate analysis, which, while celebrating the releases of arbitrarily detained individuals, does not speculate about who won and who lost, because it understands that the three governments involved have fundamentally won: knowing that they can conduct politics by harming the lives of hundreds of people by using them as “pawns.” Beyond the fact that the agreement is, as some suggest, a mixture of diplomacy, human rights, and political interests, the extortionate detention machine has proven useful, especially for Venezuela.
Returning to hostage diplomacy, what just happened is unfortunately part of a growing trend. As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture has warned, “certain States are increasingly detaining foreign nationals under fabricated or exaggerated charges to serve foreign policy or other objectives (…) these States prolong and complicate release while denying the detainees’ status as hostages or wrongful detainees.” In the Venezuelan case, it should also be remembered that, although hostage-taking is not explicitly listed as a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute or international humanitarian law, the harms inherent in hostage-taking, such as torture, make it a crime against humanity when it is committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, and with knowledge of that attack. This position is supported by the opinion by the Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia when it found Tihomir Blaškić guilty of “inhuman or cruel treatment of civilians and, in particular, their being taken hostage” as a crime against humanity.
In light of legal precedents, if the Venezuelan State finds that hostage diplomacy generates political gain, it will then have to bear the probable cost of further adding to its list of crimes against humanity. And, in that sense, it is essential that States understand the magnitude of the problem in Venezuela and adopt measures not only aimed at freeing the hostages, but also at denouncing and preventing the practice and prosecuting its perpetrators, establishing international cooperation mechanisms to achieve these ends. Addressing only the consequence (the hostages) without addressing the cause (the de facto regime) contributes to the perpetuation of the system. The uses of this system can make it more complex and harmful, and therefore, more difficult to contain. The fact that other States replicate hostage diplomacy is an eloquent symptom of its vocation to establish itself. Therefore, the issue is not the detainees in Venezuela, which constitute sufficient reasons to act, but rather the development of a criminal mode of influencing international relations by violating the most basic principles of international law.
We reiterate our call to articulate a multi-pronged strategy where negotiation is not the only and necessary path. A multilateral, coordinated, and high-level response is needed, utilizing all the tools of international law to halt the advance of hostage diplomacy through a system of collective pressure. Travel bans on nationals and bilateral meetings with Maduro from a logic of every man for himself, will not help reverse this new weapon of transnational repression. It is key to reach consensus based on the premise that a regime like Venezuela’s harms us all, and that the leadership of other actors, such as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who have so far held a low profile is required, assuming a decisive role in the face of a crisis with global impact.