An emergency comprises multiple layers. It has more visible and painful facets, such as those produced by the natural disaster that has kept the country in mourning since June 24. At the same time, it incorporates other dimensions, although not as evident, yet profound and decisive in people’s lives: those of an institutional and political nature. The reconstruction of Venezuela not only faces challenges of engineering, humanitarian assistance, financing or administrative capacity, but also first-rate challenges regarding democratic legitimacy, those related to the political architecture -the model and the actors- that will be in power, and on which all of the above depends, marking the chances of a Nation to rise up and get out of a permanent state of emergency.
When we speak of democracy and actors legitimized by the Constitution, we are referring to the indispensable condition of having solid and functioning institutions, capable of inspiring trust and making decisions transparently, with respect for the rights of the population, especially the most vulnerable. As the organization Provea points out, the distribution of aid must be guided by criteria of need and non-discrimination. Families expect that aid will actually arrive and that the projects will be completed. International organizations and aid workers need to be confident that resources will be managed by responsible officials, democratically elected and in accordance with the existing legal framework. Without trust, the response is hampered. Therefore, addressing the emergency does not mean circumventing the Constitution; on the contrary, it is the framework of principles and rules within which the response is secure and sustainable.
The devastating earthquakes that shook the north-central region of Venezuela acted as a catalyst on a map of pre-existing political rifts. The natural tragedy did not occur in an institutional vacuum, but rather on a severely eroded sociopolitical terrain, amidst a humanitarian and constitutional crisis accumulated over years of human rights violations, the collapse of public services, large-scale corruption, and subservience to foreign powers of varying persuasions for the benefit of the ruling party’s interests. For this reason, there are pre-existing political challenges that have been exacerbated or drastically redefined by the emergency caused by the earthquakes. Below is a brief overview of some of them.
First, after a period of interim leadership that exceeded the maximum six-month term stipulated by the Constitution, media outlets and political actors are beginning to refer to Delcy Rodríguez as President, plain and simple. This move is not innocuous. It aims to position the de facto ruler in a stable position of power, seeking to normalize the misfortune of being governed by Maduro’s successor. The country urgently needs to hold legitimate presidential elections, among other reasons, because the earthquakes demonstrated the government’s lack of capacity and will to adequately address this emergency. It is enough to recall that during the first 72 hours, the state response was overwhelmed and slowed by its own political decisions, revealing the operational disconnect between ministries and the armed forces, as well as the lack of large-scale civil protection protocols. New, trustworthy, and independent authorities are needed to enforce the Constitution.
Secondly, the dual power structure in Venezuela demands a constitutional and sovereign change adapted to the current circumstances. Since January 3rd, the country has been mired in an ambivalent political architecture: a superficial political power exercised from Caracas, and a real economic power wielded by the current US administration. This foreign protectorate is increasingly revealing its limitations and contradictions. It is quick to extract oil and other resources that benefit the Rodríguez-Trump regime, and very slow to reform institutions and prepare the country for a reconstruction response with access to financial resources. Neither the de facto government is capable of attracting the investments and resources the country needs, nor is the protectorate willing—or daring—to release and channel the necessary funds to allow for a broader and more timely response for the surviving population. This dual-headed governance model, composed of a perverse dictatorial bureaucracy and an equally perverse financial and military tutelage, works very well together, leaving Venezuela teetering on the brink of collapse. Perhaps the scheme contributed in the short term to a better response than would have been expected under a Maduro government and without foreign oversight. Beyond speculation, this nonetheless sets a negative precedent for the country’s medium- and long-term recovery.
Another political challenge arises with the emergence of a new attempt at dialogue between a fragmented opposition, battered by the Venezuelan regime—this time led by leaders of the now-defunct National Assembly (2015-2020)—and the de facto government, under a US-sponsored format. It is deeply concerning that the conversation is framed by the natural disaster, as if nothing that existed previously in the country was sufficient reason for discussion, and that the counterpart is a representation of the opposition—albeit legitimate—ultimately chosen by the de facto government and the protectorate, a group of people who invoke a constitutional authority that has already expired and which, at least formally, does not include the leader of the largest democratic opposition force in Venezuela today, María Corina Machado. Adding to this list of concerns are the stated objectives. The National Assembly’s communiqué, signed by Jorge Rodríguez, announces “strengthening democracy,” not democratizing it, which could foreshadow minimal and superficial efforts, under the assumption of a democracy that already exists and only needs reinforcements. Even though the work agenda, the actors, and any eventual commitments and guarantees remain to be defined, the political will for a democratic transition remains in question.
It should be noted that this tactical mobilization by the ruling party responds, in principle, to the urgent need to establish a minimal bipartisan spokesperson, or what some call an emergency political council, to channel international humanitarian aid and ease the financial restrictions imposed on the country. However, the real test, as stated in the preceding paragraph, lies in whether these talks will represent a genuine governance agreement or simply a temporary mechanism to mitigate, once again, the social and international pressure on the regime.
The final political challenge that will be discussed here is an inevitable consequence of the above and concerns the appropriate channeling of citizen frustration and powerlessness. Venezuelans’ distrust of public institutions has increased over time. Faced with the collapse of the official response in the initial stages of the disaster, civil society, communities, and independent local governments—such as municipalities that activated their own protocols—reacted through self-managed systems, without depending on the central authority. While solidarity and social self-management are valuable traits, they also reflect the void left by a failed state in its most basic function of providing protection. The accumulation of unresolved social discontent creates, to use the language of this natural disaster, a “major tectonic fault line in the people,” susceptible to triggering new and dangerous upheavals that demand a swift democratic solution.
AlertaVenezuela calls for focusing not only on the rubble and its consequences. It is essential to respond without further delay, and simultaneously, to the challenge of establishing a democratic authority that provides the minimum guarantees of transparency, respect for human rights, and constitutional accountability to address the suffering of the citizenry and prevent the social and political fabric of Venezuela from completely rupturing.