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The same repression, a different disguise: the Delcy Rodríguez regime before the UN

Interactive dialogue with the FFMV

During the 63rd session of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, the Venezuelan delegation participated in interactive dialogues with the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (FFMV) and the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD). Consistent with the state policy consolidated under Nicolás Maduro, the government’s rhetoric sought to systematically discredit reports of—and conceal—massive human rights violations. Instead of providing verifiable data or addressing the documented patterns of repression, the regime’s narrative—currently led by Delcy Rodríguez—relied on denial, propaganda, and attempts to legitimize the persecution of the actual or perceived opposition.

An analysis of Venezuela’s diplomatic discourse reveals four rhetorical themes that persist under the current de facto government. First, there is an attempt to normalize violations by appealing to a state-centric legalism. Before the WGAD, the delegation argued that the detention of opposition members was not arbitrary but rather “the legitimate exercise of State powers” and that the allegations were “politically motivated.” As PROVEA has noted, there is an irreconcilable contradiction in the official narrative: the regime releases dozens of individuals—most of whom are covered by the amnesty law enacted this year—while simultaneously insisting that it never committed arbitrary acts.

Second, in the face of rigorous reports presented by these international bodies, discrediting the findings serves as a recurring tactic to evade accountability—not only for illegal detentions but also for more serious crimes such as torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions. This reaction provides the strongest evidence of the lack of official will to acknowledge the crimes committed or to dismantle the repressive apparatus. At the same time, the regime resorts to the worn-out argument of national sovereignty to reject international scrutiny and push for “technical assistance” frameworks that are more compliant and impose no demands. Yet, it fails to acknowledge that oversight by the Human Rights Council is triggered precisely as a subsidiary response to the impunity, complicity, and structural ineffectiveness of the local justice system.

Finally, the de facto government’s most masterful tactic has been to invert the roles of victim and perpetrator. The regime installed by Nicolás Maduro—and inherited by Delcy Rodríguez—portrays the State as a victim of external aggression, unable to resolve its human rights issues. In dealings with the FFMV, official diplomacy persistently blames international sanctions for the internal crisis, using them as a smokescreen to distract from the repression of protests and citizens’ demands for democratic guarantees. Furthermore, in its interactions with the FFMV and the OHCHR—and with increasing intensity since 2025—Venezuela has floated the argument of the UN’s financial crisis to divert resources away from the FFMV and toward “more cooperative mechanisms”—that is, mechanisms that neither document nor speak out against atrocious crimes.

An analysis of official rhetoric confirms that the Venezuelan State’s conduct before multilateral bodies has followed a consistent pattern since the FFMV’s creation in 2019: ensuring structural impunity for security and intelligence agencies by framing their actions as “legitimate”; criminalizing or discrediting civil society by equating it with partisan political actors; and stigmatizing victims with labels such as “terrorists” or “traitors” to justify the widespread violation of their rights. This situation unfolds amidst signs of political easing that have projected a false image of economic and institutional normalization—a scenario that coexists with a fully intact repressive apparatus for which no mid-level or high-ranking official has been held accountable. Within this hybrid framework, Delcy Rodríguez represents neither a break with nor a moderate alternative to Nicolás Maduro’s line; on the contrary, she embodies the version imposed by the United States—no less cruel or contradictory—tasked with controlling and whitewashing the very authoritarian model in which she has played a leading role alongside Maduro. Her role has been to exploit the situation following January 3rd to alleviate international pressure—including the International Criminal Court investigation—under the guise of pragmatism and dialogue.

It is these tensions within the ruling elite that prematurely tempt the less experienced to draw an analytical distinction between Maduro’s more punitive profile and a supposedly more pragmatic side to Rodríguez. However, comparing diplomatic interventions with the reality on the ground reveals this distinction to be artificial. Since the “interim” leader’s rise to power, the FFMV itself has warned of continuing arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, deaths in custody, and new torture methods in centers such as El Rodeo I and Fuerte Guaicaipuro.

AlertaVenezuela continues to denounce the fact that the de facto government is managing a calculated easing of tensions—a strategy aimed at consolidating its hold on power rather than facilitating a genuine transition. Targeted political concessions and high-stakes, closed-door negotiations serve as bargaining chips to soften sanctions and regain diplomatic recognition. As the FFMV has noted, there are no signs of a genuine, sustainable break from the Maduro regime’s patterns of repression; the clearest evidence of this is that the very perpetrators remain in command of Venezuela’s civil and military hierarchies. Thus, the political flexibility is merely apparent, as the coercive apparatus remains operational and ready to reactivate whenever it perceives a real threat to its hegemony.

Without the will to acknowledge crimes, provide reparations to victims, and undertake reforms leading to a democratic transition, repression is not abating; rather, it remains a fundamental pillar sustaining the “Rodrigato.” As long as changes are used as diversions and the repressive structure remains intact, the monitoring and advocacy work of the FFMV, the ICC, the IACHR, and UN Special Procedures remain essential mechanisms in the pursuit of truth and justice.