The discussion about the upcoming elections in Venezuela — a process whose date remains uncertain — has become a political battleground where each actor seeks to shape the calendar to their convenience. The debate is not minor: in a country with weakened institutions, parallel powers, and a recent history of violations of political rights and disregard for results, the question of when and how to vote is inseparable from the question of who decides and who benefits from each option.
At the center of the debate, two clearly differentiated positions clash:
Those who demand speed argue that Venezuela needs an immediate election to resolve the crisis of legitimacy of political power. For this sector, any delay prolongs uncertainty and strengthens those who currently control institutions de facto. Also, and this is central, they fear that a sudden change in U.S. policy may ease or eliminate the pressure that has brought Chavismo to the negotiating table.
Those who call for preparation argue that, given the relevance of the process, it is essential to carefully rebuild minimum conditions: a new National Electoral Council (CNE), an updated electoral registry — including millions of migrants — and basic guarantees for competition. They also consider that the complexity of a transition from authoritarianism to democracy must occur gradually.
Both positions have merits but also interests behind them. Acceleration favors actors seeking to capitalize on the political momentum of the moment, consolidating changes in a country politically and materially devastated; postponement benefits those who prefer to manage time to reorganize their power.
The so-called interim regime — which has never shown real interest in submitting to a competitive election — bets on the broadest possible postponement. Its strategy is based on prolonging institutional exceptionalism, avoiding a process that would almost certainly put its control over the State at serious risk.
Meanwhile, Donald Trump has stated that “Venezuela is not ready for an election,” a phrase that opens a fundamental debate: what does it mean to be ready? Electoral preparation is not an abstract concept; it involves technical, institutional, and political conditions. And Venezuela, despite its crisis, has accumulated experience in both electronic and manual voting, as well as a tradition of participation that can be easily reactivated if minimum guarantees are rebuilt.
The government of Nicolás Maduro has shown that the electoral calendar is, for him, a political tool. He has advanced elections when it suits him, delayed them when necessary, and modified rules and timelines with a flexibility that evidences the absence of an independent arbiter.
Who decides the date? The question of who has the authority to call elections is complex: the 2025 National Assembly, evidently illegitimate; the former 2015 National Assembly, recognized by various international actors; or the tutelary entity, acting openly or behind the scenes? This conflict among de facto powers, where all — some more, some less — lack unquestionable political authority, is obviously one of the most delicate issues that the current negotiation table must address.
Under normal conditions, the decision of the date corresponds to the CNE, but the country’s political and institutional situation has been far from normal for years. In fact, the 2024 election did not follow the traditional calendar that set the date in December, since the choice of the period (sometime in the second half of 2024) was the result of a political agreement. Everything indicates that the new electoral date will likewise be the product of some kind of agreement; what is unacceptable is that each actor — inside and outside the country — announces dates or issues judgments about when Venezuelan society would be “ready,” unilaterally.
In 2024, Venezuela held an election in a context of repression, censorship, and severe restrictions on political rights. Even so, the process produced a clear result. However, the de facto government ignored that result, reaffirming its authoritarian nature. This episode is crucial: it shows that the problem is not only when voting takes place, but what happens afterward.
An election requires certain minimum conditions, among them:
- Appointing a new CNE with technical and political credibility.
- Updating the electoral registry to include millions of Venezuelans abroad.
- Ensuring robust international observation.
- Restoring basic political rights of citizens and illegally intervened political parties.
- Lifting administrative disqualifications.
With these conditions, and with the technical knowledge available in the country in electoral matters, a reliable process could be organized within a reasonable timeframe.
The discussion about the date of the next elections is not merely administrative: it is political, strategic, and deeply linked to the struggle for legitimacy. In a country where the last clear result was ignored by those who control the state apparatus, the central question is not only when voting will occur, but whether the result will be respected.
Venezuela needs to rebuild trust, institutions, and rules. Only then can the act of voting regain its democratic meaning. For this, regardless of the election date, the gateway to a possible transition is the agreement on an electoral schedule that includes all essential steps — both political agreements and technical aspects — to reach the election itself. A schedule defines the framework of political action — the electoral path — determines the rules, the actors, and the timing. If it is thought that Venezuela is not ready for an election, it is precisely because it has not been called. Once the call is made based on a schedule, the pieces align, the actors activate, and society participates.
Once a schedule is established, Venezuelan society must address the next step: What happens after the election? How can society guarantee civilian primacy in a politically delicate moment? What will be the attitude of the tutelary entity once the election is held?
Venezuela is going through a complex period, and how it faces it will determine much of the nation’s future. For now, a greater commitment is needed to the elements that could lead to the transition — and among them, fundamentally, the election. Despite delays and unnecessary postponements, Venezuelan society wants to vote again, to fulfill once more the civic duty it expressed in 2024 and that was taken away by force. The necessary conditions must be created, and when the time comes, the electoral contest must begin.
It is vital that the international community closely accompany this process, contributing to the laborious path back to the rule of law, to help guide the country along the path of institutions. May the starting signal of an election illuminate the road back to democracy: Ready, set, go!