On Friday, July 27, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) presented an update to the Human Rights Council on the (non)compliance with the recommendations made by the UN human rights protection system to Venezuela, which was followed by an interactive dialogue. This analysis covers some highlights of the report, as well as the issues most frequently mentioned in the interactive dialogue and Venezuela’s reactions.
The first thing that stands out is a more forceful tone in both the written document and the oral presentation compared to previous reports. In fact, the presentation was scheduled to be made by the Deputy High Commissioner (as was the case in March 2025), but at the last minute, it was announced that the High Commissioner himself would present the report, which denotes the greater importance given to this report, in particularly complex circumstances in the relationship between the OHCHR and the Venezuelan State.
When referring to the situation of economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights, one issue the report repeatedly highlights is the opacity of government conduct, evident in the absence of official information on matters such as mortality rates, environmental decisions, the updated census of the indigenous population (the most recent is from 2011), and gender violence. This opacity extends to the non-publication of the national budget since 2017. A significant element is the fact that, despite the OHCHR maintaining its wink when referring to the issue of unilateral coercive measures, in this report it maintains that “[t]he absence of public financial data on the sanctions prevents a comprehensive assessment of their impact on the human rights of the population in Venezuela.” In this way, the report undermines the official narrative that seeks to justify the serious deficiencies in the area of economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights invoking the sanctions.
In the field of civil and political rights, the report openly addresses the growing practice of enforced disappearances and presents alarming records of rights such as due process, personal liberty, personal integrity, gender-based violence, association, and peaceful assembly, all within the context of a highly repressive response to the population’s demands for another flagrant concealment of information, such as the failure to publish the results of the July 2024 presidential election. These are rights that were massively violated throughout the period covered by the report, and which cannot be protected by the effects of sanctions against Venezuelan officials.
In short, Venezuela fails to comply with recommendations or facilitate international monitoring work, to the point that the report ends by reiterating previously issued recommendations and adding eleven others regarding new facts and situations observed during the period. Venezuela’s lack of interest in cooperating with the UN human rights system was evident when the country’s representative left the room in the middle of the debate. For his part, the general prosecutor issued a statement recommending that Venezuela withdraw from the Human Rights Council.
This report covered the period from May 1, 2024, to April 30, 2025. It should be remembered that the OHCHR was summarily expelled in February 2024 and had a partial and very limited return—as the report itself acknowledges—beginning in December of that same year. In other words, we are witnessing a more forceful report than all the previous ones since 2020, which was prepared during the absence of the Caracas team for half a year and the other half with a minimal presence in the country. This fact should be taken into account when assessing the appropriateness of renewing a memorandum of understanding that has expired and that, before its expiration, was already being implemented in a very limited manner.
In the interactive dialogue, democratic countries echoed the grave human rights situation and demanded the release of political prisoners and the restoration of the battered civic space. At least seven countries also referred to detained foreigners, reflecting an emerging situation that generates particular concern due to the de facto government’s repeated violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
The delegations that spoke also called for an end to the partial return of the OHCHR to Venezuela and called for the renewal of the memorandum of understanding, which was mentioned by 18 countries. This widespread message from states in favor of the OHCHR’s return to the country contrasts with the complete absence of mention of the issue by the 10 NGOs that spoke on behalf of civil society. There is undoubtedly a message behind this silence on the issue, which forces us to consider the value of a restrained presence, in contrast to more vigorous action—as was the case with this report—from outside the country. Undoubtedly, some changes in the team in Geneva have also favorably influenced this reorientation of approach toward Venezuela, as was evident in the intervention during the Office’s response to the interactive dialogue. Whether or not the OHCHR has mourners within the country will depend on its ability to build a space for dialogue with civil society and democratic countries about the meaning and purpose of its presence, six years after the beginning of its troubled field operation.