“Hostage diplomacy” has been used by several countries and organizations to influence the political and economic decisions of other governments. It is not a new phenomenon, but it is not very common either, as it tends to flourish in authoritarian countries that require survival tactics in the face of international isolation and the pressures they are subjected to. It refers to the deliberate capture of foreigners as a bargaining chip to obtain political, economic, or diplomatic benefits, becoming a tool of geopolitical influence when it is articulated and unchallenged.
In the Venezuelan case, hostage diplomacy gained momentum after the popular will was ignored in the 2024 presidential elections. The machinery of repression against dissent, after years of refinement, incorporated a two-way transnational approach: persecuting Venezuelan dissidents outside its borders and also foreign citizens entering the country. Therefore, prisons no longer only punish nationals, but also display a more cruel and systematic connotation as a foreign policy mechanism by locking up people who entered Venezuela for tourism or family visits. Setting foot on the territory can make them victims of arbitrary detention and subject to exchange.
Shortly after the July 2024 presidential election, the same government claimed to have detained around 150 foreigners. Most were arrested between August 2024 and February 2025. Their nationalities range from Spain, Italy, and Germany to Colombia, Ukraine, Uruguay, Mexico, Argentina, among others. They have been detained without evidence and on generic charges such as “terrorism” or “conspiracy,” and suffer the characteristic violations of the policy of repression, such as forced disappearance or incommunicado detention, cruel treatment or torture, lack of due process, and public stigmatization. Without trial and adrift, they also suffer from a lack of consular access, which violates the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Even in cases where this visit does materialize, it is limited in scope and conditioned by the logic of blackmail that accompanies hostage diplomacy. It is clear that these cases, stemming from the same roots and having essentially political motivations, could constitute crimes against humanity.
The countries of the world have an obligation to protect their nationals. The search for protection can legitimately lead to a dynamic of exchange with the de facto regime. Nothing in these lines is intended to undermine political negotiations or any other advocacy strategy undertaken by States. However, we must examine the repressive structure and not focus solely on its consequences (individual cases): the gain obtained through quick and specific concessions could pose a danger to other nationals in the country or to other potential ones who must travel and become the new bargaining chip. It is a system that can only be fueled to the extent that it is used. Therefore, discretion or “silent diplomacy” as the only approach for states tends to reinforce the logic of blackmail and cannot ensure sustainable and principled results.
Amid the accelerated spread of the phenomenon, there is concern that some states, faithful to their commitment to protect their citizens, may, under undue pressure, agree to concessions that amount to recognizing Maduro or his institutions as legitimate. This would be a lethal form of harm to the country’s population—Venezuelans and others—who would be exposed to the excesses of a government whose international cost has tended to be nil. In the worst-case scenario, its eventual realignment with the international community could lead to a model of isolation where repression and its political, social, and economic consequences leave democratic countries in greater trouble, as they will continue to seek ways to confront it from a less favorable position.
There are currently several simultaneous cases in which foreign political prisoners are being used to pressure political recognition and trade, which only sustains the cycle of arrests and the persecution of more people. The most serious of all is the pressure on Chile (because the Amestica brothers remain imprisoned and in poor conditions) and Colombia (with more than a dozen prisoners in Venezuela) to hinder Chile’s investigations into the murder of Lieutenant Ojeda in February 2024. Colombia currently has four alleged members of the Tren de Aragua gang being sought by Chile for extradition in the Ojeda case, while Venezuela is trying to convince Colombia to send them to Caracas, which would affect the case.
The only possible solution must combine a multi-pronged strategy where negotiation and silence are not the only path, as they can be counterproductive. Public denunciation, complaints before international criminal courts and multilateral organizations, as well as individual sanctions, are part of a range of options. A multilateral, coordinated, and high-level response among countries is required to halt the advance of hostage diplomacy through a system of collective pressure. Travel bans on nationals and bilateral meetings with Maduro will not help reverse this new weapon of political repression. It is key to reach consensus based on the premise that a regime like Venezuela’s harms us all, and that the leadership of other actors, such as the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who have so far held a low profile is required, assuming a decisive role in the face of a crisis with global impact.