Six months have passed since Delcy Rodríguez was appointed interim president. This period was supposed to end a cycle of provisional rule, but it has not, leaving the country in the atypical situation of the end of an interim presidency, as mandated by the Constitution, but with the indefinite extension of a mandate, thanks to an ambiguous decision carefully calculated by the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ).
The institutional crisis deepens
The path to the intensification of the constitutional and democratic crisis after January 3rd began with the TSJ’s declaration of a “forced absence” of the President, as a consequence of an event it referred to as “foreign aggression” causing a “kidnapping.” This pronouncement, which it labeled as “precautionary” in order to maintain “the administrative continuity of the State,” was based on a category that does not exist in the Constitution and is outside its scope, since in Venezuela presidential absences are either temporary or permanent and can only be announced by the National Assembly (AN). Although the Supreme Court of Justice opened a third option, what is striking is that it did not implement a novel solution, but rather applied the legal consequence foreseen for cases of temporary absence, ordering the Vice President to assume the Presidency in an acting capacity, without establishing a time limit for this purpose. Regardless of the judicial body’s arbitrary actions, the AN should had fulfilled its obligation to classify the absence as temporary or permanent, as required by Articles 233 and 234 of the Constitution. This did not happen.
Since then, the legislative branch has maintained a complicit silence regarding the situation, completely disregarding its regular agenda as if the US armed intervention had never occurred. This deliberate omission of recognizing an extraordinary event and obeying the Constitution was the first sign of what would later become a continuous process of surrendering national sovereignty.
The Role of the National Assembly
The National Assembly focused on maintaining its iron grip on the state apparatus through the strategic appointment of Jorge Rodríguez, brother of the de facto president, as president of the legislative body. From this position, the regime has pursued three complementary political objectives.
First, it moved forward with the appointment of loyal servants to head the other branches of government, such as Larry Davoe as Attorney General and Eglée González Lobato as Ombudsperson. These appointments were made through arbitrary procedures, due in part to the lack of pre-established objective criteria, the absence of pluralism in the composition of the selection committee, and ultimately, the selection of individuals who demonstrate a clear affinity with the Venezuelan regime. It is foreseeable that the selection process for Supreme Court justices will suffer the same fate.
Second, control of the National Assembly has served to shift the electoral agenda and simulate a series of cosmetic changes in political life. Thus, by neglecting its constitutional obligation to declare the president incapacitated and call for elections, the Rodriguez siblings regime has indefinitely postponed an electoral roadmap to re-legitimize government authorities under the pretext of stabilizing the country. While the de facto government promotes a narrative of a “new political moment” through dialogues on judicial reform, consultations on certain legal initiatives, and even a timid opening of public debate with subtle concessions to the media and some controlled public demonstrations, this supposedly renewed political climate brought about by the Rodriguez siblings regime encounters an insurmountable limit: the failure to initiate an electoral process that would entail losing power and opening the door to a democratic transition. In reality, persecution, censorship, and disinformation as elements of the machinery of repression remain intact.
Finally, and in contrast to the political and electoral agenda, trade relations with the United States have accelerated, with the National Assembly playing an active and leading role, serving US interests. The approval of legislative reforms in the areas of hydrocarbons, mining, and administrative management, while concentrating decision-making in the Executive branch, favors business in the oil and mining sectors. This aims to allow foreign companies to enter and operate without public oversight, undermining human rights guarantees and having a greater impact on the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples. The economic interests of both countries have driven the dismantling, through legislation and institutional practice, of any obligation to prevent, ensure transparency, and guarantee accountability for potential abuses. Furthermore, the de facto government of Rodríguez continues to withhold information on how the resources generated by these businesses, especially oil revenues, will be used and how these resources will reach the population in the form of services and access to rights. The synergy has been such that the Trump administration continues to congratulate the de facto government for its “cooperation and excellent work.”
A provisional situation that seeks to endure
Thus, the current situation in Venezuela is marked by the absence of legal frameworks and the prevalence of political ones. The 90 days stipulated by the Constitution for the vice president to temporarily assume the presidency have passed, and the 90-day extension has just expired. Since no interpretation by the Constitutional Chamber can supersede the letter of the Constitution, a new period began on July 3. With the interim period over, Delcy Rodríguez’s exercise of power further exposes what is clearly a de facto regime. In other words, the regime that was already operating “de facto” now does so without even the tenuous protection that the interim status conferred upon it.
Now, outside the constitutional framework and in a situation of tutelage – the threat of military action similar to that which occurred on January 3 – the institutional precariousness of the foundation on which power in Venezuela rests is more marked.
Rubio’s Three Phases and the Electoral Conversation
The situation arising from the events of January 3rd seemed poised to bring some liberalization of civic space, some mitigation of the authoritarian character of the regime. This, however, has not happened. While the interim government has made a few striking changes —dismissals of officials publicly associated with human rights violations, torture, or corruption— these dismissals not only failed to lead to the initiation of legal proceedings to establish accountability, but those dismissed were also frequently reassigned to high-profile positions.
The relationship that the de facto regime has established with the United States is truly unique. On the one hand, the U.S. government has indicated its interest in supporting the stabilization of the Venezuelan crisis, the country’s economic recovery, and, ultimately, the transition to a democratic system through an election held with internationally accepted guarantees. However, to date, few steps have been taken toward addressing this third phase of democratization, and the road ahead is long: establishing a reliable electoral body, reviewing the voter registry, and modernizing the technical capabilities of the electoral authority.
Only recently has there been any event related to the electoral issue: the U.S. government arranged a meeting between the de facto authorities and the president of the National Assembly elected in 2015, who has since been recognized by the U.S., to discuss this matter. Thus, the oversight body determines both the agenda and the interlocutors for key issues in the Venezuelan situation.
Both the electoral process and the liberalization of rights that the authoritarian regime has violated from Venezuelan society are underpinned by a fundamental tension: the US exerts pressure based on its own interests, prioritizing the economic aspect, while the de facto regime makes minimal effort, announces measures it fails to implement or only partially implements, and generally seeks to buy time in anticipation of some unforeseen event that will allow it to remain in power. Thus, an apparent opening has ended up being merely cosmetic, including appointments that have garnered significant headlines, without any consideration given to the equally or even worse profiles of those replacing the ousted officials.
Informality as the norm
The atypical constitutional situation in which the country finds itself is not limited to the actions and omissions of the Supreme Court and the National Assembly.
On January 3, a decree declaring a state of emergency was issued, signed by Nicolás Maduro, who, curiously, was already under arrest at that time. The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (TSJ) declared the decree constitutional belatedly, and the National Assembly (AN) never issued a ruling on the matter. Although the circumstances that gave rise to the decree remain valid—an armed attack and a deployment of actions by the United States government—it was not renewed after its initial expiration on April 3. Despite the decree’s stated aim to “repel aggression against Venezuelan territory and protect the rights of the population,” in practice it has done the opposite: repelling the population through censorship and persecution and protecting the rights of the United States through expedited regulations tailored to its needs.
Another manifestation of the lack of institutional framework is seen in the amnesty law, which lasted for two months and four days, until April 23, 2026, when Delcy Rodríguez announced the end of its application, despite lacking the authority to do so. She then transferred responsibility for considering amnesty applications to the Program for Democratic Coexistence and Peace, a de facto entity without any decree, resolution, or other act of government to establish it. Thus, an incompetent authority repealed a law and delegated its application to an entity that does not formally exist. The freedom of thousands of Venezuelans who remain arbitrarily detained or face trials without due process rests in the hands of this legal abstraction.
Furthermore, the Program for Democratic Coexistence and Peace had a 100-day operating period, which expired on May 3. Following the same informal procedures, Rodríguez decided to extend its functions indefinitely. At least four members of the program are now ministers, and one is in charge of Government Restructuring and Reengineering, a local version of Trump’s DOGE.
Venezuela on the International Agenda
Meanwhile, the debate on Venezuela in international forums risks slipping down theagenda if Trump manages to promote his narrative of a country where people are happy, dancing, seeing oil bubbling beneath their feet, and have a president who is doing a great job. With six months having passed since the US armed intervention and the constitutional term of the interim government expiring—at least in theory—the risk of a return to normalcy in Venezuela remains. Rubio’s three-phase plan, which sets elections as the ultimate goal, could be slowed down as a consequence of the recent natural disaster, burying aspirations for democratic recovery under the rubble of an opaque political agenda.
The international community must pay close attention to the social, economic, and political-institutional indicators that contradict Trump’s narrative and ensure that the country does not lose its way in this long drift toward authoritarianism under foreign tutelage, in order to continue striving for a genuine transition to democracy.