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Beyond Whitewashing the Regime: Milestones for Venezuela

Working session between the Venezuelan State and the UN System. October 2026.

In recent months—particularly since July 2026, when the 180-day constitutional limit for Delcy Rodríguez to assume the role of interim president expired—the de facto government has accelerated its communication and institutional outreach strategy. The aim has been to shift the country’s focus toward various political priorities that—at least temporarily—displace the issue of the executive branch and its relationship with foreign tutelage. It is both contradictory and discouraging that an undemocratic authority—one commanding the state’s repressive apparatus—has managed to steer the debate away from its own legitimacy and operations and toward other branches of government, thereby positioning itself as the key player in ensuring the implementation of necessary political changes.

Within a matter of weeks, Venezuela saw the launch of various initiatives: an amnesty law and the release of several political prisoners; a national consultation on criminal justice reform; tentative gestures toward the country’s stifled media landscape; and even a call for civil society participation in the judicial nominations committee ahead of the Supreme Court’s renewal. These measures are presented as evidence of the political will driving the new era defined by the “Rodrigato.” Yet, beneath this official narrative lies the same strategy *Chavismo* and *Madurismo* have long used to burnish their image and diffuse domestic and international pressure during critical moments: engaging in a form of “simulated cooperation”—centered on multilateral and national dialogue—that effectively blocks independent scrutiny and any reforms that might jeopardize their grip on political power.

The de facto regime has perfected a mechanism for diplomatic legitimation, leveraging the presence and technical assistance of international bodies to improve its public image. It has done so—albeit not without friction—with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and various United Nations cooperation agencies. By signing labor agreements, hosting international delegations, and proposing legislative reforms or personnel changes that do not alter the political leadership’s discretionary power to run the State, the “Rodrigato” now seeks to employ this strategy within its negotiation agenda, relying on a U.S. administration whose primary pressure is to extract oil and other resources. This performative cooperation allows the authorities to argue that formal channels for internal improvement exist; it also appears to stall urgent human rights demands—such as establishing an electoral roadmap and addressing the humanitarian needs that continue to degrade the population’s quality of life.

The fragility of the official narrative—and the regime’s true intent behind it—is exposed when one contrasts its rhetoric of cooperation with the de facto government’s hostile stance toward independent human rights oversight mechanisms, such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Procedures, and the Fact-Finding Mission.

Regarding the Fact-Finding Mission, the State’s response—including that of the Rodrigato—has not been cooperation, but rather a persistent refusal to allow entry into the country, the dismissal of the Mission’s reports, the lack of response to their requests for information and dialogue, and desperate attempts to cut off its funding. Despite these maneuvers, the investigations meticulously documented by this international body have demonstrated that the alleged procedural improvements and justice system modifications are merely cosmetic. Patterns of persecution, the arbitrary detention of dissidents, the criminalization of human rights defense, and the use of the judicial apparatus as an instrument of repression remain in force; their command structures and procedures stay intact, ready to be deployed whenever deemed necessary. The rejection of the Mission’s scrutiny confirms that the *Rodrigato*, much like its political predecessor—tolerates only those forms of international engagement it can shape to its own advantage, while shunning any mechanism that challenges its hegemonic narrative. The recent extension of the Mission’s mandate through 2028 serves as a reminder to the United Nations and individual states to keep their focus on what matters most for Venezuela’s political stability and democratic recovery: comprehensive reparation for victims.

In this dual-track scenario—where the de facto government seeks resources and external validation while other governments and organizations genuinely aim to offer support—the international community risks fostering actors that facilitate the consolidation of tutelage-based authoritarianism. It is paradoxical and unacceptable for the very regime that appeals for international funds and technical assistance to “strengthen” its institutions to simultaneously persecute and stifle civil society groups seeking funding for human rights advocacy and defense activities.

As we noted in a previous edition, providing technical assistance, political legitimacy, or financial resources to a government with dictatorial tendencies—without making such aid conditional on concrete steps toward democratic opening and the restoration of civic space—is a strategic error that reinforces the very system it seeks to rectify. International engagement must not be driven by naivety or enthusiasm for empty promises and ambitious slogans designed to manipulate public discourse.

The United Nations system and democratic states must adopt a firm stance toward the de facto government, making engagement conditional on specific actions. The national consultation on the criminal justice system, which involves UN agencies and programs, offers an opportunity to do so. Experience interacting with Venezuelan authorities points to the need to demand verifiable, significant, and irreversible milestones, including:

1.           Unconditional access to the country for the Fact-Finding Mission, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Procedures.

2.           The full release of all political prisoners and a definitive end to the criminalization of actual or perceived dissent.

3.           The repeal of restrictive laws and an end to attacks on civil society.

4.           Genuine guarantees of judicial independence, shielding the selection processes for judges and magistrates from interference by the ruling party. 5.         A transparent timeline for the restoration of electoral and democratic guarantees and the timely holding of free and fair elections in the country.

6.           Authorizing the unhindered entry and deployment of UN agencies and programs and international NGOs into the country, ensuring that humanitarian aid is distributed directly and is not subject to patronage-based control or political discrimination.

Without these measurable commitments, any transfer of resources or diplomatic endorsement would not represent progress, but rather a mechanism of complicity in whitewashing an authoritarian regime that continues to systematically violate the rights of the Venezuelan people.