In a new episode of reshuffling of forces within the government, the government-appointed Attorney General, Tarek William Saab, has confirmed the arrest in recent days of 570 prosecutors for acting against the law, including judges in the states of Bolívar and Nueva Esparta, under accusations of “corruption schemes” and “indecorous conduct.”
As an example, since September 7, at least 14 prosecutors—including the chief prosecutor of Carabobo state, Miguel José Durán Trejo—have been arrested for allegedly participating in an extortion scheme targeting citizens with open cases, demanding sums of money from them in exchange for procedural favors, according to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. Prosecutor Saab presented the operation as “exemplary and transcendental against degraded elements of the justice system.”
Also arrested was the 67th National Prosecutor, Farik Karin Mora Salcedo, who was sanctioned by the United Kingdom in June 2020, the European Union in November of the same year, and Canada in January 2025 for his human rights violations. More than five years have passed since he was first sanctioned, so his recent arrest is not related to such pressure measures, but rather to internal reasons. Similarly, terrorism judge Ángel Gabriel Betancourt Martínez is reportedly being held at the Sebin (National Securities and Exchange Commission), forcing the suspension of hearings, such as that of the Provea human rights defender, Eduardo Torres.
This move has generated a public backlash and has been interpreted by analysts and former officials in exile as a sign of Tarek William Saab’s “fall from grace.” According to former prosecutor Zair Mundaray, the regime’s attorney general may be “losing the favor of the top brass,” a precedent that would mark the beginning of a new phase of control and discipline within state institutions. This pattern of criminalizing officials when they are no longer useful or become a risk has been a constant in Venezuela’s recent political history, such as the corruption scandals at PDVSA, which affected Tarek el Aissami.
The official narrative focuses on the fight against corruption; however, the lack of transparency in judicial processes and statements by officials who lack credibility and guarantees of independence raise doubts about the true motivations. The arrests occur in a context of internal tensions and without due process, which reinforces their arbitrary and indiscriminate nature, and for purposes other than those declared.
Whatever the explanation for the situation, it is clear that the Venezuelan justice system, far from being independent, operates as a tool of power to punish even those outside the inner circle of the leadership. The regime, amid its growing isolation, sanctions, strong pressure from the US, and denunciations by the international community, does not tolerate power leaks or the existence of control centers that do not answer directly to it. In this way, the judicial system becomes a mechanism for internal cleansing, where it seems that the accusation of corruption is the pretext used to get rid of unwanted elements and replace them with more loyal ones. This, in a context of the elimination of any plural and autonomous space within Venezuelan society, could shed light on the logic of the transformation to political totalitarianism.
The Venezuelan judicial system, therefore, is unreliable and completely broken. For some time now, decisions have been made not based on the law, but rather to please a certain group in power. Once the agents cease to be functional to that group, they become victims of the very monster they have nurtured, as in the case of executioner Farik Mora. The judiciary, instead of being a counterweight, has become the enforcer of repression. Periodic purges serve to remind the remaining officials that their continued tenure depends on their unconditional obedience, spreading fear and eliminating any semblance of independence.
The main victim of the absence of a true justice system, and in general of democratic institutions based on the rule of law, is the Venezuelan civilian population itself, which has suffered systematic and widespread human rights violations and, in several cases, crimes against humanity, especially those labeled as “dissidents.” Thousands of people are still persecuted for their desire for change and for demanding their human rights after the 2024 electoral fraud, but they are repressed by the same powerful groups vying for complete control of the country.
Given this situation, it is imperative that the international community rethink its response strategy to the complex humanitarian emergency facing Venezuela. The local justice system has proven unwilling to serve its institutional and legitimate purposes, but rather spurious objectives of a different nature. Therefore, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court must decide once and for all whether it makes sense to continue insisting on a presence of its office in the country when evidence grows daily for the opening of a case and the formulation of the corresponding charges. The lack of democratic institutions and the continuous internal purges are further proof that the Venezuelan justice system does not exist and that the regime has no will to genuinely cooperate.