On February 19, the National Assembly unanimously approved the Amnesty Law for Democratic Coexistence, an instrument theoretically aimed at releasing hundreds of people prosecuted for political reasons and closing legal cases linked to episodes of conflict that occurred between 1999 and 2026. A parliamentary commission was created to monitor compliance with the law, and deadlines were set for the courts to review the files and implement the corresponding measures.
Although the de facto government has presented the law as a step toward political reconciliation, this interpretation is overly optimistic considering the large number of potential beneficiaries excluded. Instead of a step toward reconciliation, it would be more accurate to recognize that the law provides relief for several people, but it is by no means a mechanism that implies institutional progress, both because of its serious omissions and its lack of relevant safeguards, not to mention the political context in which it is intended to be applied.
The law established a limited scope of application to specific periods (Article 8), which excludes many prisoners of conscience from amnesty. Furthermore, it instituted the arbitrary condition that potential beneficiaries “be present”—appear before Venezuelan courts—which primarily harms exiled individuals, especially refugees or asylum seekers. This is not improved by the inclusion of the right to have a lawyer request amnesty on their behalf. It is a contradiction that exiled individuals must apologize to the State and return to the country only to lose their international protection status. More broadly, the approved text failed to establish guarantees of safe return, as it did not mandate the reinstatement of passport validity or prohibit silent immigration alerts. The same is true of its silence regarding the restitution of seized property or the reinstatement of individuals dismissed for acts covered by amnesty, among other significant omissions.
As Provea points out, there is a real risk that the state’s repressive apparatus and the legal framework that sustained will not be dismantled. This includes the Law Against Hatred, the Anti-Society Law, the Simón Bolívar Law, the Law on Financing Terrorism, various crimes in the penal code, and other instruments. Also, victims of human rights violations will not find truth, justice, or reparations. This is why this law must be combined with structural reforms, beginning with the justice system, in order to restore its independence and thus protect the right to dissent in Venezuela. For now, only limited, revictimizing pardons exist, which reinforce the power concentrated in the very system responsible for crimes against humanity.
It is not just the text of the law that is problematic. Its implementation has already begun to draw criticism. The National Union of Press Workers denounced that the terrorism courts refused to accept the requests submitted by a group of journalists. According to a statement, “the courts were either on ‘duty’ or without a court office, or they were referring victims to the corresponding public defenders,” in violation of Article 11 of the law that recognizes victims’ right to request amnesty. As this organization reports, the refusal to accept the petitions constitutes a denial of justice and a direct violation of the current legal mandate. Furthermore, political prisoners have warned that the line to enter the courts in Caracas “is huge”, which adds to the bureaucratization of a process that, in any case, required ad hoc mechanisms to process the amnesty requests of hundreds of people simply and quickly. As expected from the de facto regime, additional obstacles were imposed that function as mechanisms of political control, in a bid to wear down and despair the public.
According to Congressman Jorge Arreaza, president of the Law Monitoring Commission, as of last Friday, the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Supreme Court had received 379 amnesty applications that were to be processed in the coming hours. However, it is impossible to know the potential beneficiaries or even to verify that number. The de facto regime never published official lists nor opened the process of verifying alleged releases to civil society, so all that exists are piecemeal, discretionary releases that cause even greater pain to the families. The very opaque handling of the issue has fostered false expectations to manipulate society.
The numerical reality of the victims casts the worst shadows on this law: more than 600 people remain detained for political reasons, with systematic delays in their trials, and many living in complete legal limbo. What is needed to end this suffering is not a law; it is a political decision that the ruling party not only refuses to take but is deliberately avoiding at all costs. It suffices to point out that the approved text, in its Article 16, ultimately institutionalizes political control and intimidation over Venezuelan society, as “those benefiting from this Law who are found to have committed crimes after its entry into force will be prosecuted in accordance with applicable legislation.” In short, as we warned in previous editions, amnesty is partial, conditional on silence, submission to the ruling party, and the non-exercise of any rights. Otherwise, the repressive machinery will respond.
These distortions take place because the regime has always played at mitigating the consequences in order to simulate cooperation. It is not interested in fixing up the root causes. Nothing other than a democratic transition might generate guarantees of political stability, protection of human rights, economic and social development, and ultimately, peace in Venezuela. This is inexorable, and history has demonstrated this. It seems that this fact is often forgotten or conveniently altered or hidden by those close to power.
Certain spokespeople act as if Venezuela has improved with the amnesty law or with a few releases from prison compared to the people who remain behind bars, or in exile, under protection, censored, tortured, disappeared, or executed. For example, Spain has announced that it will ask the European Union to lift the sanctions against Delcy Rodríguez, supposedly to align with “the current political situation in the country.” Colombia, whose prosecutor’s office authorized the extradition of military officer Juven José Sequea, who engaged in Operation Gideon, behaves as if it had never hosted Venezuelan political exiles. The worst part of his case is that, after serving his sentence in Bogotá, he was released and immediately detained to be handed over to the de facto government. Just one fact to reiterate what we are talking about: relatives of those imprisoned for Operation Gideon are demanding proof of life from Venezuela for their family members, as they have not received any information for more than six months. Meanwhile, Trump insists that Delcy Rodríguez “is doing a good job,” which aligns with those promoting the narrative of a “moderate” and “pragmatic” official.
The international community should oppose these new attempts to whitewash the de facto government, even if they come from the United States. In Venezuela, most of changes, while crucial for many victims and the advocates who support them in one way or another, remain merely cosmetic, as they point to a simple strategic realignment by the same regime. There is no transition, no steps toward political reconciliation, nothing of the sort. Delcy Rodríguez and many officials continue to be held responsible for crimes against humanity and serious human rights violations. Public institutions remain co-opted, and the repressive structure remains intact. The persecution has not ceased, and the population’s living conditions continue to be mired in a humanitarian crisis. And the opposition, the one that mobilized the country since July 28, remains absent from the negotiating table. Curiously, they have not reacted or at least questioned his own marginalization.