“Changing everything so that nothing changes” is a premise used in politics, inspired by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s novel Il Gattopardo (The Leopard). A commission for coexistence with a non-diverse composition, released prisoners who are not truly free, an emblematic torture center closed while others remain open, with detainees and no accountability for those responsible, including the imposed interim president herself, a judicial reform led by the person who has most interfered with judicial independence, a proposed amnesty law that could end up being anything and that is already facing obstacles from members of the coexistence commission. Beyond striking headlines, there is no fine print indicating that the announcements will not end up being a Gattopardo-like maneuver. Hence the need to establish indicators that allow us to measure the true scope of these announcements and others to come, beyond the headlines.
In mid-January, a group of Venezuelan and international human rights NGOs formulated Ten Urgent Demands to guide a genuine democratic transition in Venezuela, which provides elements to move in the right direction, if there is truly a will for a transition to democracy. The announced headlines seem to be in line with the decalogue, but the fine print does not. We will focus on three aspects.
Civil society participation and citizen consultation
Messengers are already being sent through non-institutional channels to request selective meetings between civil society organizations and the coexistence commission, in what could be a replica of previous approaches with a sector of civil society in 2022, which led to a fracture that persists.
If there is no genuine consultation process, everything will be a futile exercise. For years, those in power in Venezuela forced civil society to retreat, criminalizing their work, imposing suffocating regulatory frameworks, persecuting their representatives, and choosing their “interlocutors.” Now they pretend to play by the rules of democracy, but they maintain opaque, exclusionary, and selective practices. It is time to put the rhetoric to the test, demanding unbiased and inclusive spaces for dialogue, with a coexistence commission that reflects diversity in its composition. Calls for dialogue “in a personal capacity,” sending messengers, or setting peremptory deadlines that attempt to force civil society to attend improvised meetings, without sufficient time to agree on positions and messages, are unacceptable. If we have waited 27 years, we can wait one more week, because what matters is not the photo opportunity at Miraflores Palace, but the sincerity of the dialogue.
An indicator of true participation would be the publication of the amnesty bill on the National Assembly’s website, opening the consultation period established by the rules of debate and ensuring that the observations submitted by family members and organizations working for the rights of political prisoners, as well as other victims of political persecution and crimes against humanity, are taken into account. It would also involve allowing public debate on the bill, without criminalizing dissent or the public or private contributions submitted by organizations and victims to influence the process.
Resources for the humanitarian response
The rapid enactment of a hydrocarbons law could be considered positive, even though it represents a 180-degree turn from the state policy that has been in effect for exactly 50 years. Doubts remain, not only in Venezuela but also in the U.S., regarding the use of resources from oil revenues, the accountability mechanisms, and how these resources will reach the population in the form of services and access to rights. It is difficult to understand how a government that has dismantled the social welfare system for vulnerable sectors in its own country, has erased the language of inclusion and human rights from its public policies, and has eliminated international cooperation, could be interested in benefiting the neediest in Venezuela. As the Ten Principles indicate, it is necessary to ensure an adequate operating environment for humanitarian actors, with access, security, and logistical facilities at all territorial levels of the country where there are people in need of assistance and protection, taking into account the financing and coordination criteria that we developed in a previous analysis.
Diplomacy and Multilateral Cooperation
A U.S. chargé d’affaires has arrived in Venezuela. She is not an ambassador, and the difference matters. Venezuela, for its part, has appointed an equivalent representative to Washington. So far, the announcements do not include the re-establishment of consular relations, although this measure was announced with the Dominican Republic. It is estimated that nearly one million Venezuelans live in the U.S. who, for years, have been deprived of consular services, affecting their civil rights. This situation is repeated in various countries where the Venezuelan population lacks rights with respect to their country, including the right to political participation, due to illegal barriers to voter registration. These barriers must be removed as soon as possible, with the understanding that differences between governments must be resolved through diplomatic channels, without affecting consular services.
In the field of multilateral cooperation, Venezuela has systematically failed to fulfill its international obligations, expelled the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), did not renew the visas of OHCHR officials, ignores the mandate of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission (IIFFM), and maintains a debt to the UN. The mistreatment of the UN began to change at the end of 2025 when Maduro sent calls for help to Guterres. In mid-January 2026, interim President Rodríguez asked the OHCHR to verify the lists of released political prisoners, in what could be the beginning of a new relationship. This relationship cannot reduce the OHCHR to becoming a notary for the de facto government. The process of counting the released prisoners must be accompanied by the closure of the cases that remain open against them, verification of their physical and emotional health, the urgent release of those with health problems, the resumption of family visits, and the signing of a publicly available memorandum of understanding that allows full access of the OHCHR to Venezuela and that aims at the establishment of a fully-fledged country office.
The international community has sufficient elements to establish a system of indicators for monitoring compliance with minimum steps that point towards substantive progress beyond grand announcements, so that real changes can occur.