The release of political prisoners in Venezuela continues at a trickle. A discretionary and deeply painful system is imposed on families due to the lack of official information and the control of expectations. In this regard, the NGO Justice, Encounter and Forgiveness (JEP) confirmed a total of 53 releases on Monday, January 12, after the Ministry of Penitentiary Services announced earlier “the release of 116 people” whom it linked to “acts associated with altering the constitutional order and threatening the stability of the nation.” As of January 15, the JEP had corroborated, through independent verification, 100 releases compared to the official announcement of 116 people, which would be added to the 157 documented in December 2025, totaling 257 releases, still far from the 406 announced by the regime.
With these figures, the aforementioned organization has emphasized that the number of released political prisoners “remains far below” the current number behind bars, which stood at 1,011 cases as of last Thursday. As it has reiterated on several occasions, this gap reinforces the need for greater transparency, independent verification, and for releases to be carried out fully, effectively, and without arbitrary exclusions. Likewise, the organization has insisted on the obligation to prioritize immediate attention to cases involving the most vulnerable profiles, such as adolescents, people on the autism spectrum, women, the seriously ill, and the elderly, who suffer the most severely from the circumstances of political imprisonment.
The arbitrary way in which the situation of political prisoners is handled was echoed in a statement by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission. Its statement of January 12 focused on the impact on families, many of whom still do not know the whereabouts or legal status of their loved ones, urging the authorities to act with urgency and promptness. “Public information must be provided on plans for further releases, including the criteria applied, the timeframes, and the number of people contemplated (…),” the Mission stated. It noted that what is happening is part of a broader context of repression, which in recent days has included reports of armed groups patrolling cities, intimidating the population, and conducting searches and inspections of cell phones, as well as reports of other arrests of people for expressing political opinions. The repressive machinery built on the crime of persecution remains intact and active in this situation.
For its part, the IACHR also issued a statement in response to these recent events. In addition to echoing concerns similar to those of the Fact-Finding Mission, the Commission noted that it has conducted “continuous and systematic monitoring of the human rights situation in the country, observing a progressive deterioration of the rule of law, democratic institutions, and fundamental guarantees,” which, along with the economic and social crisis, has triggered one of the largest migration flows in the world. The Commission emphasized Venezuela’s responsibility to protect and guarantee all the human rights of its population, and stated that it cannot invoke the state of emergency decree to commit abuses or reprisals in the name of security or peace.
The assessment is that the Maduro regime continues to withhold official lists of those released from prison, making it impossible to know precisely who has been released, when, and in some cases, where they were being held. This situation fuels anxiety and misinformation within communities. Nor has the regime provided information regarding the legal status of those released. However, it is known that most, if not all, were merely released, which implies the continuation of the criminal proceedings and the risk of re-arrest, as well as the subjection of individuals to certain alternative measures, such as prohibitions on testifying, leaving the country, and appearing in court under a system of periodic reporting. In short, the outlook, while somewhat encouraging, remains unstable and without guarantees.
On the other hand, the United States Secretary of State has indicated that an action plan for Venezuela is being pursued, consisting of three stages: stabilization, recovery, and transition. While this framework makes sense, given that the transition requires a certain degree of stability and the establishment of a foundation for the recovery of an economy that currently exhibits extremely precarious indicators and significant imbalances, the order in which these stages are presented relegates the transition—that is, the redemocratization of Venezuelan society—to a secondary role and makes it remarkably dependent on the other processes. Democracy cannot be subordinated; rather, it must be an integral part of the process itself.
This stage also requires the implementation of a series of reforms that enable redemocratization in formal terms, as well as measures that contribute to creating a political climate conducive to coexistence. Among the formal measures is the establishment of an electoral authority capable of operating independently, led by a group of directors who enjoy the support of all political sectors, and staffed by technical personnel whose operational and ethical competence inspires confidence in all.
This potential new electoral authority, for its part, must be capable of conducting a complex electoral process that re-legitimizes all branches of government. Another factor requiring the utmost attention is the restructuring of the country’s legal and regulatory framework. After nearly three decades of the legislative branch being subservient to the executive branch, and of case-by-case legislation tailored to a hegemonic executive, these laws have gradually become guardians of a centralized power incompatible with a democratic system. Is it possible to address these delicate challenges relying solely on the initiative of those currently in power? Is a mere mention of a general framework by a foreign authority sufficient to carry out such a meticulous task? Is it even desirable for such sensitive matters to be undertaken in an openly tutelary manner? Everything indicates that it is not. Therefore, the urgent priority must be to hand the reins to the opposition of July 28th and other actors, including civil society, in order to create conditions for a controlled negotiation environment that leads to solid and lasting agreements for a democratic transition.
These are just some of the serious problems facing Venezuela, and today more than ever the international community has a duty to support this process, always prioritizing a comprehensive understanding of the situation. Only with a genuine transition and fully established democratic institutions can progress be considered to have been made in Venezuela’s current situation, thus preventing even greater harm.