Venturing scenarios in a situation like Venezuela is really complex. Next January 10 is the date on which the new constitutional period begins, and this date comes with the highest levels of uncertainty. The factors that decisively influence the different developments that the country may have that day are many and very varied. Let’s look, first of all, at some of the events that have occurred in recent months, to understand the general picture:
a. The 2024 presidential elections were held in a context of advantage and abuse of power, with State resources deployed in favor of the Maduro candidate, partial alteration of the electoral date, unconstitutional disqualification of opposition parties and leaders, and the impossibility of registration for more of 5 million voters. As a corollary of this situation, the National Electoral Council proclaims Maduro the winner without showing the voting records in a disaggregated manner, that is, without support.
b. The opponent Edmundo González Urrutia presented the official voting records from approximately 80% of the electoral centers, which indicate his victory with more than 67% of the votes.
c. The Maduro government is deepening its repression against the opposition: it is imprisoning and kidnapping political leaders, imprisoning citizens who served as members of the electoral tables in the vote, and imprisoning military commanders. At the same time, it is announcing new electoral processes for 2025 and hinting at possible modifications to the electoral regulations.
d. The governments of Brazil and Colombia have indicated that they will not recognize the election until there is evidence of the real results, however, there is a tendency to favor that time dilutes the strong pressure that Maduro has today.
e. Donald Trump won the US presidential election, who has appointed politicians clearly opposed to Maduro to the Secretary of State.
f. After decades of maintaining iron control over Syria, the dictator Bashar Al-Assad was deposed, fleeing into exile in Russia.
g. The High Commissioner for Human Rights has indicated that “The authorities have confirmed the arrest of some two thousand people since the elections. I am concerned that many of these people have been arbitrarily detained, including teenagers and young adults, members of the opposition, human rights defenders, journalists and lawyers, as well as passers-by…”
h. The investigation by the International Criminal Court into crimes against humanity in Venezuela continues its course and the patience of Prosecutor Khan seems to be running out.
Obviously, a context like this does not allow for a succinct analysis of scenarios; in fact, both the events in development and the actors in play can decisively condition the course of events. One sector in particular, the military, plays a leading role in this picture. However, there are two scenarios that have the greatest probability of occurring:
- Democratizing initiatives fail: In this scenario, international pressure is diluted as a consequence of the lack of definition of Brazil and Colombia, as well as a noisy but erratic policy of the United States and a passive attitude of the multilateral field from the UN. At the same time, Maduro maintains and deepens internal repression and manages to prolong the cohesion of the military sector at his side. In this scenario, human rights violations, forced migration and the complex humanitarian emergency would reach unsuspected levels, given that the already precarious government action would be restricted almost exclusively to the sphere of defense, repression and maintaining political power at any cost.
- The transition is being woven: the US, Brazil and Colombia build a scenario of joint pressure and negotiation, the ICC announces concrete advances in its investigations and points out the responsibilities of the chain of command in crimes against humanity, the political organs of the UN play a proactive role. The invasion of Ukraine continues, and Russia, an open ally of Maduro, devotes all its attention to kyiv. In this scenario, internal pressures are produced within the ruling elite, fundamentally in the military sector, which seek to stop the deterioration and fear the eventual extension of the ICC arrest warrants and bet on a democratic transition.
These are only two possible scenarios for January 10. There are many more, although they are probably derivations of the previous two. In any case, it is clear that the overcoming of the rule of law, the separation of powers and respect for human rights can only advance in a context in which the transition from the authoritarian regime to the democratic system takes place.
Thus, it is reaffirmed that Venezuela requires special attention from the international community, and that it is vital that it channel all its efforts into finding a way out in favor of the restoration of a democratic order.
We wish our readers a prosperous 2025, with the hope that respect for human rights and the establishment of a democratic and peaceful culture will soon become a reality both in Venezuela and in the region.