

Contributions from Venezuelan civil society to the midterm update of the Universal Periodic Review

June 2025

This report was prepared by AlertaVenezuela with contributions from 15 Venezuelan organizations dedicated to a variety of issues and rights. It consists of a compilation of assessments, based on each organization's expertise and mandate, on the status of compliance with the recommendations accepted by the Venezuelan state within the framework of the Third Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).

In the third UPR cycle, Venezuela accepted 221 of the 328 recommendations made by states. For this report, 88 of the 221 accepted recommendations were analyzed, based on the responses to the consultation with civil society organizations. The recommendations are grouped into different rights groups, as shown in the table of contents, and ordered consecutively. Each recommendation was assessed according to the degree of compliance by the Venezuelan state, according to four categories: met, partially met, not met, and in regression. It is possible that different assessments may be given for the same recommendation, as each organization manages its own compliance assessment indicators.

The Venezuelan state has repeatedly ignored the mandate of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela, as well as the reports submitted by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, prepared based on Human Rights Council resolutions. Venezuela's rejection of these mechanisms is based on arguments alleging an alleged selective practice in monitoring certain countries, as well as allegations of interference in internal affairs, as these mechanisms do not have the consent of the state concerned.

Venezuela recognizes the Universal Periodic Review as the only valid peer-to-peer human rights monitoring mechanism. In this sense, the complete failure to comply with recommendations voluntarily accepted by the Venezuelan state refutes its narrative of alleged cooperation with the international human rights protection system in peer review forums, even when these recommendations have been accepted by the country.

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CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.58 (South Africa). Continue efforts to reform the prison system in accordance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Mandela Rules).				
<u>Justification</u> Women and adolescents detained during the 2024 post-election protests were not classified by gender or age at the time of their arrest, and were held in cells shared with men, increasing the risk of gender-based violence. Furthermore, since there was no distinction between crimes at the time of arrest, they were held in the same spaces as people who had been charged with serious crimes. The crisis in the Venezuelan prison system and the decline of economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights (ESCER) have had a distinct impact on prisoners. In this regard, the Venezuelan Prison Observatory (OVP) has denounced the precarious conditions experienced by prisoners, indicating that they are overcrowded in small cells and deprived of access to basic services such as water and electricity, guarantees that are obligations of the State. They lack full access to their right to food, as they do not receive a balanced diet. Various human rights organizations have documented and denounced that the diet provided by the Ministry of Penitentiary Services is precarious and does not meet nutritional standards, as it is based on rice and grains.¹ An example of this is the case of Daisy Chirinos, a woman who had been confined to the National Institute for Women's Orientation for seven years. She died of malnutrition after the institution refused to transfer her to a health center. This is an example of negligence and inaction in the part of the State.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.114 (Ireland) Review laws and regulations on terrorist financing , registration and funding imposed on civil society organizations, to ensure that they comply with international human rights standards, their number, and the country.				
<u>Justification</u>				

¹Digital News. They only serve pasta with mortadella and call them terrorists: this is how detainees are treated at protests, according to OVP.
<https://noticierod1g1tal.com/2024/08/only-pasta-with-mortadella-and-they-tell-them-terrorists-this-is-how-they-treat-detainees-at-protests-according-to-ovp/>

As of the date of this report, multiple sublegal laws and regulations have been enacted under the guise of combating and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing (PLAFT) that are inconsistent with international human rights standards, including Recommendation No. 8 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The most restrictive regulation enacted to date has been the Law on the Oversight, Regularization, Operations, and Financing of Non-Governmental Organizations and Non-Profit Social Organizations, which, based on an institutional presumption of civil society culpability, includes highly punitive provisions against these organizations.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.169 (Slovakia) Ensure freedom of expression and support a plural and safe communication environment				

Justification:

During 2024, 619 complaints of violations of the right to freedom of expression were recorded, representing a 61% increase compared to the number of violations recorded in 2023. This figure places 2024 as the period with the highest number of violations in the last 5 years. Limitations on journalistic coverage, the lack of informational transparency of the State, and the criminalization of critical speech resulted in an increase in arbitrary arrests of communicators, activists, and citizens for the sole reason of sharing content of public interest in 2024.

From January 2024 to April 2025, 10 journalists and media workers were imprisoned for their journalistic work. Most were subjected to enforced disappearances during the first hours, days, or weeks of their detention. In at least one case, a journalist's whereabouts remain unknown months after being last seen with state security forces. The detained journalist is the mother of a 5-year-old child, and her husband was also imprisoned and criminally prosecuted.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.171 (Slovenia) Ensure the protection of human rights defenders against harassment, criminalization, and persecution, and adopt a policy for the protection of human rights defenders.				

Justification

The criminalization of human rights defenders in Venezuela led the IACHR to condemn their persecution in the context of the post-election period.² This situation is not new in Venezuela, as the State has applied the logic of the internal enemy to strengthen social control over the population and reduce civic space.

In this sense, in July 2021, Javier Tarazona, director of FundaRedes, was arrested. This arbitrary detention was followed by that of Rocío San Miguel³ in February 2024 and then in April, that of the journalist and activist Carlos Julio Rojas, evidencing the escalation of repression as the electoral process developed, and which worsened after the presidential elections.⁴

On August 2, Kennedy Tejera, a lawyer, and public defender with the NGO Foro Penal, was arrested by the DGCIM (General Directorate of Immigration and Customs) while providing legal assistance to individuals detained during the post-election protests. (These activists remain in custody at the time of writing this report.) Similarly, on August 3, Yendri Velásquez, an LGBTQ+ rights activist, was detained at Maiquetía Airport as he was preparing to travel to Geneva to the Committee Against Racial Discrimination. His passport was also revoked there.⁵

Likewise, in January 2025, defender Carlos Correa, director of the NGO Espacio Público, was the victim of arbitrary detention, although he is free, demonstrating the risks involved in being a human rights defender in the country.

All of these actions have been carried out against social defenders and activists in recent months, generating uncertainty and anxiety for those working for human rights in Venezuela.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.175 (Ukraine) Provide a democratic environment conducive to the activities of the political opposition, journalists, and human rights defenders				

The July 28, 2024 electoral process was marked by an increase in state persecution, primarily targeting political opponents, activists, protesters, and journalists. In the weeks leading up to and following the elections, mass arbitrary arrests, threats, harassment, and illegal raids on the homes of leaders critical of the government were reported.

The repression also reached the digital and legal spheres: websites like the social network X and the Signal platform were blocked, independent media outlets were censored, and regulations were used to prosecute dissent. These actions reflect a systematic pattern of restricting fundamental freedoms, both in physical spaces and virtual environments.

² IACHR condemns persecution of human rights defenders in Venezuela <https://acortar.link/Jv6oGX>

³ Timeline of the Rocío San Miguel case <https://acortar.link/F9yIOS>

⁴ Venezuela: Civil society and dissident voices face an incessant escalation of persecution <https://acortar.link/y8oRcX>

⁵ They denounce the arrest of LGBTQ+ activist Yendri Velásquez <https://acortar.link/7PtNdw>

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.184 (Bulgaria) Protect and promote freedom of expression , ensure the safety of journalists, and respond to alleged violations				
<u>Justification:</u> 138 journalists were victims of restrictions on freedom of expression, information, and the press in Venezuela during 2024. This group accounts for 34% of documented cases, making them the most vulnerable to violations such as restrictions on street coverage, surveillance, aggression, intimidation, and attacks. Official discourse continues to stigmatize the work of journalists in Venezuela, positioning them as political actors opposed to the government and targeting them for attacks and persecution. From January 2024 to April 2025, 10 journalists and media workers were imprisoned for their journalistic work. Most were subjected to enforced disappearances during the first hours, days, or weeks of their detention. In at least one case, a journalist's whereabouts remain unknown months after being last seen with state security forces. The detained journalist is the mother of a 5-year-old child, and her husband was also imprisoned and criminally prosecuted.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.186. (Côte d'Ivoire) Ensure a free environment that allows civil society organizations to carry out their work and adopt a policy of protection for human rights defenders .				
<u>Justification</u> The Venezuelan state has not guaranteed a free environment for civil society organizations. On the contrary, it has constantly persecuted, harassed, and legislated against them. Even today, at least four human rights defenders are deprived of their liberty, and more than twenty defenders and journalists have had their passports arbitrarily revoked.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.189 (Czech Republic) Establish a free and enabling environment for the work of civil society organizations and ensure that human rights defenders and civic activists are not publicly persecuted, harassed, or stigmatized.				

Justification

The Venezuelan state has not guaranteed a free environment for civil society organizations. On the contrary, it has constantly persecuted, harassed, and legislated against them. Even today, at least four human rights defenders are deprived of their liberty, and more than twenty defenders and journalists have had their passports arbitrarily revoked.

In addition to failing to comply with this recommendation, the government has increased repression. It enacted three new laws that seek to impede the activities of organized civil society and further restrict civic space. These are: a) Law on the Oversight, Regularization, Operation, and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organizations (Official Gazette E. No. 6,855 of 11/15/2024); b) Simón Bolívar Law against the imperialist blockade and in defense of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Official Gazette E. No. 6,859 of 11/29/2024); c) The resolution of the People's Party (PP) Ministry of Economy and Finance through the Superintendency of Banking Sector Institutions (Official Gazette E. No. 467,654 of 31/03/2025). In the first six months of 2024, 247 cases of persecution and criminalization were documented as part of the Nicolás Maduro government's policy to maintain its hold on power. During this period, sixteen cases of persecution and criminalization affecting nongovernmental organizations were documented; two affected universities; and four affected trade unions. Additionally, there were 111 cases of victims linked to politics and fifty cases affecting the public. Sixty-four communications workers were also victims of persecution and criminalization while on the job.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.192 (Estonia) Create a safe and non-discriminatory environment for the press, civil society and humanitarian organizations and ensure the safety of those working in these fields.				

Justification

The Venezuelan state has not guaranteed a free environment for civil society organizations. On the contrary, it has constantly persecuted, harassed, and legislated against them. Even today, at least four human rights defenders are deprived of their liberty, and more than twenty defenders and journalists have had their passports arbitrarily revoked.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.194 (Georgia) Guarantee freedom of expression				

Justification:

In 2024, a notable increase in attacks on freedom of expression was observed, negatively impacting news diversity and restricting citizens' ability to inform themselves and share ideas. There were 619 documented cases of violations of this right, a 61% increase over the previous year, making 2024 the year with the most incidents of this type in the last five years.

The Venezuelan State has not implemented structural measures to reverse the trend of systematic violations of the right to freedom of expression and the criminalization of the dissemination of information and opinions.

From January 2024 to April 2025, 10 journalists and media workers were imprisoned for their journalistic work. Most were subjected to enforced disappearances during the first hours, days, or weeks of their detention. In at least one case, a journalist's whereabouts remain unknown months after being last seen with state security forces. The detained journalist is the mother of a 5-year-old child, and her husband was also imprisoned and criminally prosecuted.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.196 (Dominican Republic): Intensify efforts to improve the guarantees and provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in relation to the exercise of fundamental freedoms and the right to participate in public and political life .				

Justification

The right to freedom of association has been severely restricted by the Law on Oversight, Regulation, Action, and Financing of NGOs, passed in 2024. This law requires civil society organizations to comply with restrictive regulations that affect their autonomy and limit their legal personality. Furthermore, it is linked to the Simón Bolívar Law and the Asset Forfeiture Law, both of which seek to impose punishments on opponents or those perceived as such. Likewise, freedom of expression has been severely affected by the censorship of critical media outlets, many of which have closed, and the harassment of journalists, who have suffered an increase in arbitrary arrests since 2023.

Regarding political rights, the State has disqualified political leaders, both members of the opposition and those perceived as such, preventing their participation in electoral processes and the country's political life. The loss of independence and autonomy of the National Electoral Council (CNE, for its Spanish name) has generated distrust among the population, as interference by other public powers in its functioning has been documented, calling into question the impartiality of the election organization. Furthermore, the restrictions imposed on national and international election observers have hampered the transparency of the elections, violating the right to free and fair elections. Finally, the failure to implement special registration and data update programs deepens the gap for citizens, especially young people, and migrants, who are unable to participate in elections.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
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31.197 (Italy) Guarantee freedom of expression and opinion both online and offline and access to justice for victims of violations of these freedoms, and ensure that human rights defenders, journalists, and humanitarian personnel can carry out their work in a safe environment				
<u>Justification:</u> There were 120 cases of restrictions on freedom of expression on the internet, equivalent to 39% of the total cases documented in 2024. This not only directly affected digital media but also the use of social media by journalists, political leaders, and citizens in general. Similarly, the ongoing power and telecommunications system failures affected internet connectivity, indirectly limiting the right to receive, seek, and disseminate information. From January 2024 to April 2025, 10 journalists and media workers were imprisoned for their journalistic work. Most were subjected to enforced disappearances during the first hours, days, or weeks of their detention. In at least one case, a journalist's whereabouts remain unknown months after being last seen with state security forces. The detained journalist is the mother of a 5-year-old child, and her husband was also imprisoned and criminally prosecuted. As part of the post-election crackdown, Nicolás Maduro's government blocked the social media platform X and the instant messaging platform Signal. The blocking of thirty-two websites by the National Telephone Company of Venezuela (Cantv) and private operators was also documented. Twenty-eight people were arbitrarily detained for disseminating content through social media and online platforms.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.198 (Japan) Take concrete measures to ensure freedom of opinion and expression , as well as freedom of the media, taking into account reports submitted by human rights institutions and human rights treaty bodies				
<u>Justification:</u> The government established the National Cybersecurity Council, defined as an advisory body to the executive branch to prevent the illicit use of technologies. This entity would operate a network to monitor digital activities and have the authority to request information from institutions and citizens. At the same time, the National Assembly made progress in approving a bill against Fascism, Neofascism, and Similar Expressions, whose vague definitions—and possible use to criminalize critical views—sparked concern in social sectors and the media. Additionally, the Simón Bolívar Liberator Organic Law against the Blockade was ratified. This law restricts freedom of expression by imposing sanctions on those who express				

dissenting opinions, under the guise of "protecting national sovereignty." Regarding the punishments, this instrument speaks of imprisonment from twenty-five (25) to thirty (30) years and fines in the amount in bolivars equivalent to between one hundred thousand (100,000) and one million (one million) times the exchange rate of the currency of highest value published by the Central Bank of Venezuela.

From January 2024 to April 2025, 10 journalists and media workers were imprisoned for their journalistic work. Most were subjected to enforced disappearances during the first hours, days, or weeks of their detention. In at least one case, a journalist's whereabouts remain unknown months after being last seen with state security forces. The detained journalist is the mother of a 5-year-old child, and her husband was also imprisoned and criminally prosecuted.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.199 (Latvia) Promote and protect the right to freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of the media , as well as the safety of journalists				

Justification:

In 2024, 24 journalists and media workers were arbitrarily detained while on duty. We also recorded the closure of twenty-three media outlets nationwide, twenty-one of them radio stations.

From January 2024 to April 2025, 10 journalists and media workers were imprisoned for their journalistic work. Most were subjected to enforced disappearances during the first hours, days, or weeks of their detention. In at least one case, a journalist's whereabouts remain unknown months after being last seen with state security forces: this journalist is the mother of a 5-year-old child, and her husband was also imprisoned and criminally prosecuted.

These restrictions do not promote and protect the right to freedom of expression; on the contrary, they limit citizens' ability to access information in a timely manner. These actions were accompanied by accusations, verbal harassment, and stigmatization by state officials toward journalists and independent media outlets.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.203 (Lithuania) Ensure respect for the freedom of assembly , opinion, and expression of peaceful protesters				

Justification:

The Venezuelan state does not guarantee respect for freedom of assembly, opinion, and expression during public demonstrations. Instead, it has implemented measures to limit civic space and restrict the right to protest. The Constitutional Law against Hate, for Peaceful Coexistence, and Tolerance and similar regulations in Venezuela affect these rights. These laws, under ambiguous concepts such as "incitement of hatred" or "promotion of fascism," criminalize opinions critical of the government, peaceful protests, and the activities of civil society organizations. Between 2022 and 2024, at least fifty-seven people were arrested for alleged hate crimes.

Freedom of assembly is also directly compromised, as social protests are frequently categorized as "acts of hate" or "fascist," making them easier to suppress.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.204 (Malta) Ensure respect for the freedom of assembly, opinion and expression of persons participating in peaceful demonstrations, in accordance with the Constitution				

The Venezuelan government fails to ensure respect for freedom of assembly, opinion, and expression during public demonstrations and has implemented policies that reduce civic space and restrict the right to protest.

The Constitutional Law against Hate, for Peaceful Coexistence, and Tolerance reflects this reality. Such instruments undermine these freedoms by using vague terms such as "incitement to hatred" or "promotion of fascism," which allows for the prosecution of criticism of the state, peaceful protests, and actions by social organizations. Between 2022 and 2024, 57 people were arbitrarily detained for alleged hate crimes.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.207 (Netherlands) Take effective measures to ensure freedom of expression , free access to information and freedom of the press, including by ensuring that independent investigations are carried out into all allegations of crimes against journalists.				

Justification:

From January 2024 to April 2025, 10 journalists and media workers were imprisoned for their journalistic work. Most were subjected to enforced disappearances during the first hours, days, or weeks of their detention. In at least one case, a journalist's whereabouts remain unknown months after

being last seen with state security forces: the journalist is the mother of a 5-year-old child, and her husband was also imprisoned and criminally prosecuted.

In April 2024, the National Assembly approved in its first reading a draft Law against Fascism, Neofascism, and Similar Expressions, which has raised concerns among United Nations special procedures due to its vague definition and the risk of state persecution for holding opinions.

On August 20, 2024, Nicolás Maduro created, by decree, the National Cybersecurity Council as a presidential advisory body to prevent illegal uses of technologies, establishing a network to monitor cyber incidents and with the ability to request information. Subsequently, on November 28, 2024, the National Assembly approved the Simón Bolívar Liberator Organic Law against the Imperialist Blockade and in Defense of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which restricts freedom of expression with sanctions for critical opinions.

Regarding the punishment, this instrument speaks of imprisonment from twenty-five (25) to thirty (30) years and fines in the amount in bolivars equivalent to between one hundred thousand (100,000) and one million (one million) times the exchange rate of the currency of highest value published by the Central Bank of Venezuela.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.208 (New Zealand) Ensure respect for democratic rights, such as freedom of assembly and expression, and the full participation of all parties in electoral processes				

Justification

The electoral events held between 2023 (democratic opposition primaries) and 2024 (presidential elections) were a scenario in which democratic rights were severely violated. During the opposition primaries, freedom of expression was severely limited by an order issued by the National Telecommunications Commission "inviting" the media not to cover the electoral event. This right was similarly violated during the presidential election, where public and private media outlets almost exclusively covered the government candidate. Freedom of assembly was ignored by arbitrary arrests, business closures, and the imposition of fiscal fines on individuals or entities that supported the tours of the opposition candidate and his campaign team. The political disqualification of María Corina Machado, after obtaining 93% of the votes in that election, not only deepened the pattern that directs the Venezuelan state toward a single-party system but also openly violated the so-called "Barbados Agreement."

In the context of the July 28, 2024, presidential elections, an escalation of systematic persecution against civilians was evident, with an emphasis on government critics: political opponents, human rights defenders, and journalists. During the pre-election phase, twenty-nine cases and ninety-eight denouncements related to the process were documented, including the closure of radio stations, internet blockages, censorship, and arbitrary detentions.

Nicolás Maduro announced in August the capture of more than 1,200 people, while international organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International raised the figure to 1,600 detainees, including minors and journalists, under generic charges such as "hate mongering" or "terrorist ties." At the same time, protesters were murdered, most of them attributed to state security forces and armed civilian groups affiliated with the ruling party. The Victims Monitor initiative reported twenty-four people killed, while the organization Justice, Encounter, and Forgiveness counted twenty-five.

From January 2024 to April 2025, 10 journalists and media workers were imprisoned for their journalistic work. Most were subjected to enforced disappearances during the first hours, days, or weeks of their detention. In at least one case, a journalist's whereabouts remain unknown months after being last seen with state security forces: this journalist is the mother of a 5-year-old child, and her husband was also imprisoned and criminally prosecuted.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.211 (Poland) Respect the freedom of assembly, opinion and expression of persons participating in peaceful demonstrations				
In 2024, the NGO Espacio Público documented ninety-nine arrests for exercising freedom of expression and information, representing a 254% increase compared to 2023, when 28 deprivations of liberty were recorded. Of the total number of people arrested, seventy-one were individuals (people who are not professionally involved in communications but use their social media and platforms to express opinions or share content), and twenty-four were journalists and media workers. The remaining victims were members of NGOs and public sector workers. This escalation of repression reflects a government strategy aimed at controlling public discourse and limiting civic space, which intensified following the 2024 presidential election. Of the total arrests, twenty-eight occurred for use of social media or the internet, while thirty-six arrests were made on charges of alleged incitement to hatred. The State has implemented a series of policies that restrict the exercise of fundamental rights, particularly the freedom of assembly, opinion, and expression in the context of social protests. Restrictions range from the criminalization of peaceful protests to the persecution of critical voices. This pattern consolidates an environment of self-censorship and fear among the population, where expressing dissent carries legal and personal risks.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.213 (Republic of Korea) Strengthen efforts to expand civic and democratic space , paying particular attention to the protection of journalists,				

human rights defenders and political actors from intimidation and attacks				
<u>Justification:</u> In August 2024, the ruling-party National Assembly approved the Law on Oversight, Regularization, Operation, and Financing of Non-Governmental Organizations and Non-Profit Social Organizations. This instrument establishes arbitrary and discretionary state control over NGOs, granting the Executive branch the power to suspend or dissolve organizations that fail to comply with its biased or generic provisions or that are considered to promote "fascism" or "incite hatred." The National Assembly approved the bill against Fascism, Neo-Fascism and Similar Expressions, whose imprecise definitions—and the possible use to criminalize critical positions—generated concern in social sectors and the media. Additionally, the Simón Bolívar Liberator Organic Law against the Blockade was ratified, a law that restricts freedom of expression by imposing sanctions on those who express dissenting opinions, under the argument of "protecting national sovereignty." Regarding sanctions, this instrument mentions imprisonment of twenty-five (25) to thirty (30) years.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.225 (Indonesia): Promote democracy by strengthening democratic institutions and the right of citizens to participate in political and public affairs, including possible bilateral cooperation with friendly countries				
<u>Justification</u> The institutional dismantling in Venezuela reached a new peak in the context of the 2024 presidential election. While current regulations promote citizen participation in various aspects and procedures of the electoral process, these rules are systematically and deliberately violated. A relevant concern that validates this assertion is the strategy implemented by the National Electoral Council, supported by state bodies, to prevent the registration and updating of Venezuelan citizenship in the Electoral Registry. This situation affected both potential voters in the country, who were unable to register or update their data to vote in the regions where they resided, and also the millions of Venezuelans who now live outside the country. The limited or nonexistent growth in the electoral register means that the number of citizens of voting age who are not registered is increasing. Considering that the National Institute of Statistics (INE) projections for December 2024 place the country's population at 34,090,650 inhabitants, and that, of this total, at least 75 percent would be over 18 years of age, it can be assumed that the Venezuelan electoral register, at the time of a possible presidential election, should be made up of approximately 25,567,000 citizens (including Venezuelans inside and outside the country). Considering that,				

according to the June 2024 cutoff, the Venezuelan electoral register totals 21,392,464 voters, the current registry would be missing between three and four million voters.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.226 (Belarus) To present its new and modern electoral system to the international community as a positive experience of political participation				
<u>Justification</u> The experience with the use of automated voting systems in Venezuela suffered a significant setback following the presidential election on July 28, revealing a profound lack of transparency regarding the procedures and audits required to verify the election results announced by the CNE. The Venezuelan electoral system has audits scheduled for the pre-election phases, during the process, and after the election. Both national and international observation group reports revealed that neither the technical nor the citizen audits could be completed by order of the CNE itself. Particularly noteworthy was the non-performance of the Phase I and Phase II citizen audits, which are held at the close of voting and after the machines are removed, respectively. These audits verify the votes counted by the machine versus the votes recorded on the so-called voting receipts. While they have no legal value, they serve to generate public confidence. None of these audits were conducted, and the reason for their suspension was not reported. Likewise, the 2024 presidential election schedule included technical audits of the system, ranging from the deployment of the machines and software used to the delivery of the resulting materials, such as the boxes containing the voting receipts.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.231(Ukraine)Take all necessary measures to ensure a free and fair electoral process				
<u>Justification</u> Although the 2024 presidential election process was preceded by the signing, in Barbados, of a partial agreement on electoral guarantees, which allowed for the participation of the United Nations Panel of Electoral Experts and a Mission of Electoral Experts from the Carter Center, the process was marked by a series of irregularities and failures to comply with standards that led these two groups, as well as national observers, to describe the process as undemocratic. Failure to comply with and changes to the electoral schedule, opacity and arbitrariness in the candidate nomination process, restrictions on national and foreign press coverage, restrictions on witnesses from opposition political parties, restrictions and violence in the electoral				

campaign, and fraud in the counted results are a list of the points described in the reports of the observers and experts monitoring the July 28, 2024, electoral process.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.232 (Republic of Korea) Safeguard the freedom of peaceful assembly and refrain from excessive use of force against peaceful protesters				

Justification

Between July 29 and August 29, 2024, 100% of the peaceful protests recorded were repressed, resulting in 167 arbitrary arrests and seventy-seven imprisoned minors. According to government data, more than 1,500 were detained following the July 28, 2024, elections. Some twenty-six people were killed in the context of state repression, most of them from gunshot wounds.

Relatives of those detained in the context of the electoral protests after July 28, 2024, reported clandestine transfers, spoiled food, psychological and sexual violence, precarious sanitary and hygienic conditions, extortion, prohibition of visits, denial of access to food and basic supplies, medical care and information, instability, and legal uncertainty.

Incitement to hatred, terrorism, public order disturbance, and criminal conspiracy are common accusations against protesters used to justify arbitrary arrests and other abusive and arbitrary judicial proceedings, without any evidence to support them. Detainees are denied a credible defense, are prohibited from communicating with others for weeks or even months after their arrest and are often subjected to enforced disappearances.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.235 (Romania) Adopt legal and administrative measures to address the recommendations regarding guaranteeing freedom of expression, opinion, association and the press, the right to peaceful demonstration, the rights to food and education, as well as public access to health services and medicines				

Justification:

In 2024, 23 media outlets were closed, twenty-one of which were radio stations. Likewise, at least twenty-four journalists and media workers were arrested by security forces and prosecuted for their work or for disseminating content of public interest.

The judicial persecution of journalists, as well as the administrative restrictions on media outlets, reflect the restrictive policies promoted by the Venezuelan government.

From January 2024 to April 2025, 10 journalists and media workers were imprisoned for their journalistic work. Most were subjected to enforced disappearances during the first hours, days, or weeks of their detention. In at least one case, a journalist's whereabouts remain unknown months after being last seen with state security forces: this journalist is the mother of a 5-year-old child, and her husband was also imprisoned and criminally prosecuted.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.238 (Ireland) Continue to promote and support the work of social organizations and movements,				
<u>Justification</u> Between 2022 and 2025, the persecution of social, union, and civil society leaders has continued, particularly union leaders who have been subjected to severe repression and persecution in Venezuela. ⁶				

⁶Civilis. Press Release. Available at: <https://www.civilisac.org/informes/venezuela-la-violencia-como-respuesta-estatal-al-movimiento-sindical-odevida>

COOPERATION WITH UNITED NATIONS MECHANISMS

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.19 (Senegal) Continue discussions with a view to ratifying the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance .				
<u>Justification</u> Venezuela is a signatory to the Convention but has not ratified it. The United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has reaffirmed the existence of repressive patterns in short-term enforced disappearances in Venezuela. These patterns contribute to establishing a state policy of attacking the civilian population, as denounced by the Fact-Finding Mission, which would constitute crimes against humanity. This pattern of enforced disappearances worsened before and after the presidential elections of July 28, 2024, as denounced not only by the UN Mission on Venezuela but also by UN Special Rapporteurs and working groups. The Working Group concludes that it has sent twenty-seven cases of enforced disappearance to the Maduro government, which have reportedly gone unanswered, and reiterates the State's obligation to respond to these communications. Finally, it states, "These cases are emblematic of the practices described therein, and the increase in cases received from Venezuela in this context is concerning, suggesting the existence of a pattern, which may amount to a systematic practice. This pattern appears to send an intimidating message to those who dissent from current state policies or those exercising their freedom of expression in the post-election context."				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.28 (Vietnam) Maintain cooperation with the United Nations human rights treaty bodies and mechanisms				
<u>Justification</u> Of 18 communications that the United Nations special procedures have sent to the Venezuelan State between 2022 and 2025, only one communication (AL VEN 2/2022, dated February 11, 2022, signed by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the Right to freedom of opinion and expression, Ms. Irene Khan, related to the defamation trial against the newspaper El Nacional and its results, has received a response from the Permanent Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the United Nations Office and other international organizations based in Geneva. Likewise, Venezuela has considerable delays with reviews by Treaty Bodies such as the Committee against Torture or the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.				

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.29 (Luxembourg) Engage with the United Nations human rights system , in particular by submitting overdue reports to the treaty bodies and cooperating with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the mechanisms of the Human Rights Council.				
Since the Universal Periodic Review evaluation session in 2022, the Venezuelan State has maintained an increasingly hostile stance toward various forms of international scrutiny and monitoring. On the one hand, it has delayed submitting reports to the Committee against Torture, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child ⁷. Furthermore, in February 2024, it expelled the team from the Office of the High Commissioner after it spoke out in favor of the prosecution of human rights defender Rocío San Miguel. Despite accepting their return months later, the team remains restricted from effectively monitoring the human rights situation in the country. Furthermore, organizations and human rights defenders who participate and cooperate with United Nations agencies are constantly subject to reprisals.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.33 (Australia) Cooperate with international human rights instruments and mechanisms, including by supporting regular and unrestricted visits by United Nations special procedures.				
<u>Justification</u> In February 2024, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Michael Fakhri, conducted an official visit to Venezuela to assess the food situation. His final report was submitted to the UN Human Rights Council in March 2025. The rapporteur conducted an official visit to Venezuela from 1 to 14 February 2024. This visit aimed at assessing the food situation in the country. Since 2019, Venezuela has also had a UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission, which has been an important asset in ensuring future accountability. On 27 September 2019, the United Nations Human Rights Council established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (UNHRC) through resolution 42/25 for a period of one year to assess alleged human rights violations committed since 2014. The mandate of the Fact-Finding Mission was recently renewed by the Council in its resolution 57/36 until October 2026. Despite the fact that the				

⁷ <https://x.com/AlertaVzlaDDHH/status/1479469875747721218/photo/1>

Human Rights Council resolution, when adopted, called for the urgent dispatch of a mission to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the Maduro government openly expressed its refusal to cooperate with the Mission, and thus it has never been able to enter the country. Consequently, the mission of experts and its support team settled in Panama City in January 2020, from where they conduct their work. This shows that only in some cases does the State agree to provide support for visits or carry out special procedures from international organizations without restrictions.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.39 (Algeria) Continue cooperation and technical assistance with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other international organizations in order to strengthen the promotion of these fundamental rights.				

Justification

On February 15, 2024, the government of Nicolás Maduro suspended the activities of the OHCHR in Venezuela. In April 2024, Maduro invited the reopening of the office, and in December 2024, the High Commissioner reported on the partial resumption of its activities in the country. The OHCHR's cooperation with the Venezuelan State has been marked by restrictions imposed on its members' freedom of action to monitor the human rights situation. As the situation has worsened, the OHCHR has faced increasing limitations and pressure, to the point of its expulsion in February 2024. Although its presence was reestablished in April 2024, the conditions of its activities have increased.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31. 43 (Germany) to strengthen international cooperation in the field of human rights, inter alia by allowing an increase in the staffing of the OHCHR office in Caracas and effective access to the entire country.				

Justification

On February 15, 2024, the Venezuelan State expelled the staff members of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner in Venezuela. However, while it allowed their return to the country several months later, it has not intensified its international human rights cooperation with the office, and the OHCHR's presence in the country remains at only two of the thirteen assigned posts.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
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31.43 (Germany) Strengthen international cooperation in the field of human rights, including by allowing an increase in the staffing of the OHCHR office in Caracas and effective access throughout the country				
The staff of the OHCHR office in Caracas increased progressively starting in 2023. However, they did not obtain permits to, for example, visit prison facilities and their visits to different states of the country were marked by restrictions and close official monitoring and follow-up.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.46 (Türkiye) Continue dialogue and cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other United Nations agencies				
Following the expulsion of OHCHR staff from Caracas and the concerns expressed by seven states at the 55th Session of the Human Rights Council, dialogue was reestablished with the Venezuelan State through the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, with whom the Venezuelan government agreed to the return of OHCHR staff. This situation demonstrated the Venezuelan State's willingness to act drastically against the OHCHR should its positions be rejected.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.98 (Barbados) Continue to strengthen national mechanisms for monitoring and implementing international human rights recommendations through broad consultation processes accessible to all				
The Venezuelan State has shown no effort or interest in even establishing a follow-up mechanism for recommendations issued by international human rights organizations. This is primarily due to an institutional refusal to scrutinize them, excused under arguments related to sovereignty. Therefore, the State constantly questions such recommendations, associating them with attempts at interference by foreign governments.				

FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY AND INVESTIGATION OF SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.124 (Austria) Carry out independent , thorough, and prompt investigations into all cases of human rights violations, in particular extrajudicial executions and attacks against journalists and human rights defenders and bring the perpetrators to justice.				
From January 2024 to April 2025, 10 journalists and media workers were imprisoned for their journalistic work. Most were subjected to enforced disappearances during the first hours, days, or weeks of their detention. In at least one case, a journalist's whereabouts remain unknown months after being last seen with state security forces: this journalist is the mother of a 5-year-old child, and her husband was also imprisoned and criminally prosecuted. Incitement of hatred, terrorism, disturbance of public order, and criminal conspiracy are common accusations against journalists and communicators used to justify arbitrary detentions and other abusive and arbitrary judicial proceedings, without any supporting evidence. Of the 318 murders recorded in the context of protests repressed between 2014 and 2022, only 19 (5% of the cases), all of them perpetrators, have been convicted. The remaining 95% remain unpunished. Within the chain of command, none of those responsible have been brought to justice, and impunity remains 100%.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.125 (Belgium) Immediately and impartially investigate all cases of extrajudicial executions and excessive use of force by security forces, including in the context of protests.				
Citizen protests against the lack of transparency on the part of electoral authorities after the July 28, 2024, election unleashed massive state repression, with more than 1,500 people arrested, according to official figures, and twenty-six killed in the context of street demonstrations, most of them from gunshot wounds.				

Of the 318 murders recorded in the context of protests repressed between 2014 and 2022, only 19 (5% of the cases), all of them perpetrators, have been convicted. The remaining 95% remain unpunished. Within the chain of command, none of those responsible have been brought to justice, and impunity remains 100%.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.126 (Mexico) Strengthen the capacity to carry out prompt, thorough and impartial investigations into cases of enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and excessive use of force				
<u>Justification</u> According to studies, in 2020, for the first time in the nation's history, victims of police violence outnumbered those of crime: that year there were 4,153 homicides and 4,231 deaths due to resisting arrest, for a police fatality rate of 16.2 victims per 100,000 inhabitants. Between 2017 and 2020, 545 children and adolescents were murdered, including twenty-six children who were under 12 years old at the time of their deaths for "resisting arrest." Among the arbitrary arrests of citizens following protests over the election results published by the National Electoral Council, various cases of cruel treatment, torture, disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and excessive use of force were reported. No investigations are known to have been conducted by public authorities to determine whether the officials involved in these arrests committed abuse of power or any crime punishable by criminal law.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.127 (Finland) Ensure that judicial authorities carry out, in accordance with international law, prompt, independent and impartial investigations and prosecutions of cases of extrajudicial executions, torture and arbitrary detention by national police and security forces				
Of the 318 murders recorded in the context of protests repressed between 2014 and 2022, only 19 (5% of cases) of the perpetrators have been convicted. The remaining 95% remain unpunished. Within the chain of command, none of those responsible have been brought to justice, and impunity prevails. (Source: Justicia, Encuentro y Perdón).				

Relatives of those detained in the context of the electoral protests after July 28, 2024, reported clandestine transfers, spoiled food, psychological and sexual violence, precarious sanitary and hygienic conditions, extortion, prohibition of visits, denial of access to food and basic supplies, medical care and information, instability, and legal uncertainty.

Incitement to hatred, terrorism, public order disturbance, and criminal conspiracy are common accusations against protesters used to justify arbitrary arrests and other abusive and arbitrary judicial proceedings, without any evidence to support them. Detainees are denied a credible defense, are prohibited from communicating with others for weeks or even months after their arrest and are often subjected to enforced disappearances.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.132 (Timor-Leste) Strengthen the National Commission for the Prevention of Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment				

The protests following July 28, 2024, sparked massive state repression, with more than 1,500 people arrested, according to official figures, and twenty-six killed in the context of street demonstrations, most of them from gunshot wounds.

Relatives of those detained in the context of the electoral protests after July 28, 2024, reported clandestine transfers, spoiled food, psychological and sexual violence, precarious sanitary and hygienic conditions, extortion, prohibition of visits, denial of access to food and basic supplies, medical care and information, instability, and legal uncertainty.

Of the 318 murders recorded in the context of protests repressed between 2014 and 2022, only 19 (5% of the cases), of the perpetrators, have been convicted. The remaining 95% remain unpunished. Within the chain of command, none of those responsible have been brought to justice, and impunity remains 100%.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.183 (Botswana) Expedite investigations and criminal proceedings on pending cases of death in the context of protest.				

Of the 318 murders recorded in the context of protests repressed between 2014 and 2022, only 19 (5% of cases), of the perpetrators, have been convicted. The remaining 95% remain unpunished. Within the chain of command, none of those responsible have been brought to justice, and impunity prevails. (Source: Justicia, Encuentro y Perdón).

The public protests following July 28, 2024, sparked massive state repression, with more than 1,500 people arrested, according to official figures, and twenty-six killed in the context of street demonstrations, most of them from gunshot wounds.

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS

Recommendation	Completed	Partially Completed	Not Fulfilled	In Regression
31.107 (Fiji) Strengthen efforts to establish and strengthen legislative frameworks necessary to address cross-cutting environmental challenges , including frameworks relating to climate change and disaster risk reduction.				
Justification: 1.- In 2022, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its sixth assessment points out eight risks for Venezuela: 1.1 -Food insecurity due to droughts or frequent/extreme rainfall. 1.2 -Risks to life and infrastructure due to flooding and landslides. 1.3 - Water insecurity. 1.4 - Serious health effects due to the increase in epidemics (particularly diseases vector-borne) 1.5 - Systemic risks of exceeding the capacity of public infrastructure and services. 1.6 - Risks of large-scale changes and biome shifts in the Amazon. 1.7 - Risks to reef ecosystems. 1.8 - Risks to coastal ecological systems due to rising sea levels, storm surges, storm and coastal erosion. 2. The synergy between the aforementioned risks and the vulnerability induced by the Complex Humanitarian Emergency occurring in the country since 2016 is devastating; damage has already occurred. Despite this, this recommendation has not been taken into account. ⁸				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.263 (France) Implement policies to guarantee the right to food, water, and health of the Venezuelan population.				

⁸ Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability Report <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-ii/>

Justification

In 2023, water supply failures increased throughout the country, leading to different methods of water supply, resulting in the accumulation of water in containers of various capacities, most of the time inadequately, which is a violation of ESCR rights ⁹. According to the Venezuelan Observatory of Public Services, in the Mara municipality of Zulia state alone, more than six hundred families reported going up to 15 days without receiving water through pipes, and in other sectors they go more than 60 days without service.

It is important to note that water scarcity and poor water storage harm the social and environmental rights of Venezuelans, which in turn translates into risks to their health and lives. The violation of the right to health is evident in many everyday cases in Venezuela; to mention just one example, on March 11, 2024, the residents of the Los Güires community in Delta Amacuro state spoke out against the death of a one-year-old child from diarrhea caused by drinking contaminated water.

This is not an isolated incident, as various non-governmental organizations in Venezuela have warned—in different states—of the increase in digestive and skin diseases resulting from the use and consumption of contaminated water.¹⁰

Venezuela is going through a Complex Humanitarian Emergency, the shortage of medicines and medical supplies in health centers, evidence the precariousness of a health system in collapse and that, by 2016, was already noticeable, for this reason the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, in that period, Zeid Ra'ad Hussein said the country was already experiencing a sharp deterioration in health care.¹¹

For 2021, the Global Health Security Index, which benchmarks 195 countries' ability to prevent and respond to health threats, indicated that Venezuela scored 20.9 out of 100, placing it as the worst-rated country in Latin America and one of the ten worst in the world due to its poor health capabilities. ¹²Therefore, public health system in Venezuela has decreased its response capacity since 2016, and by 2023, at least 9.3 million people suffering from a chronic health problem in the country would have no way to treat it due to a lack of resources or medication.¹³

According to the latest report by the non-governmental organization Doctors for Health, only four out of ten operating rooms in the country's main hospitals are operational. This investigation also revealed that the shortage of supplies in emergency departments is around 37% and in operating rooms it reaches 70%.¹⁴

Recommendation

Completed

Partially completed

Not Fulfilled

In Regression

⁹Human Kaleidoscope: Without water there is no life. Available at: <https://caleidohumano.org/sin-agua-no-hay-vida/>

¹⁰Human Kaleidoscope: The Decline of Public Services in Venezuela. Available at: <https://caleidohumano.org/el-declive-de-los-servicios-publicos-en-venezuela/>

¹¹UNHCR. Humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. <https://www.acnur.org/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2017/11035.pdf?file=fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2017/11035>

¹²Venezuelan healthcare is in intensive care. <https://www.dw.com/es/la-salud-en-venezuela-en-terapia-intensiva/a-62315621>

¹³El País. <https://elpais.com/internacional/2023-05-15/la-salud-publica-en-venezuela-redujo-en-70-su-capacidad-de-respuesta-desde-2016.html>

¹⁴France24. <https://www.france24.com/es/am%C3%A9rica-latina/20240408-venezuela-radiograf%C3%ADa-de-un-sistema-de-salud-en-crisis>

31.263 (France) Implement policies to guarantee the right to food, water, and health of the Venezuelan population.				
<u>Justification:</u> The Venezuelan state is hiding behind coercive measures and is indifferent to the Complex Humanitarian Emergency that the population has been experiencing since 2016. 1.- In 2024, the amount of food for 82.3% of households in Venezuela was insufficient, scarce, or very scarce, a percentage slightly higher than that recorded in 2023, where households in one of these three categories accounted for 78% ¹⁵ . 2. - 49.8% of people with serious health problems in Venezuela did not receive medical care during the year 2024 and 46.7% did not receive medicine either ^{16two} . 3. From 2021 to 2024, the proportion of households experiencing ongoing water supply failures through their piped water system increased from 35% to 45.6%. Similarly, in 2024, 48.2% of households reported signs of color contamination, 22.9% reported odor contamination, and 22.7% reported taste contamination ¹⁷ . 4. - The treatment of wastewater is one of the major environmental problems facing the country, since it is estimated that less than 25% of contaminated water is properly treated ¹⁸ .				
Recommendation	Completed	Partially Completed	Not Fulfilled	In Regression
31.268 (Indonesia) Take concrete and immediate measures to ensure that basic needs, such as food, electricity, clean water, and medical treatment , are covered				
<u>Justification</u> The general population, and especially the most vulnerable groups, continue to face pressing needs regarding basic services, food, and health care. 1. In Venezuela, food insecurity is strongly correlated with the livelihood crisis. In 2023 alone, hyperinflation reached an annual rate close to 190%. Nearly 82% of Venezuelans live in income poverty, and 53% are at risk of extreme poverty, with insufficient income to purchase a basic food basket ¹⁹ .				

¹⁵Final Report of the Community Diagnostics, 2024 <https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/report-final-de-los-diagnostics-comunitarios-2024>

¹⁶IDEM

¹⁷IDEM

¹⁸VITALIS. Less than 25% of wastewater in Venezuela is treated. <https://vitalis.net/press-releases/less-than-25-wastewater-venezuela-treated/>

¹⁹FINAL STATEMENT OF THE MISSION UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food by Michael Fakhri Visit to Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), 1-14 February 2024 <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/food/statements/20240214-eom-statement-venezuela-sr-food-sp.pdf>

2. -In January 2025, 54,029 power outages were recorded in Venezuela, which represents an increase of 1.54% compared to December 2024 ²⁰.
3. By 2023, more restrictions on access to drinking water services were recorded, as well as the highest levels of contamination reported by households. There was a drop of more than 60% in the quantity of water distributed and a 90% drop in the functioning of infrastructure, equipment, and management systems and quality of the resource ²¹.
- 4.- Eight out of ten Venezuelans are exposed to water sources unfit for human consumption. This situation has a significant impact on health, especially among the most vulnerable. The main consequences of drinking unsafe water are diseases such as diarrhea, which increased by 6.9% in 2022 and 9.3% in 2023 ²².
- 5.- 2024 closes with a general indicator of 28.4% shortage of medicines for the six morbidities: hypertension, diabetes, seizures, depression, diarrhea, and acute respiratory infections, among others in Venezuela ²³.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.273 (Lao People's Democratic Republic) Continue to adopt sufficient measures to positively guarantee the right to food of the Venezuelan people				
<u>Justification</u> The Venezuelan Association of Family Farming stated in 2022 that, due to Venezuelans' low incomes, the average meat protein intake in Venezuela had decreased from twenty-eight kilos per capita annually to 1.8 kilos. Venezuelans' low purchasing power represents problems of food insecurity. ²⁴ Despite the existing legal framework, malnutrition has increased in Venezuela since the beginning of the Complex Humanitarian Emergency in 2015, as confirmed by various international organizations. This was concluded in the Regional Panorama of Food and Nutrition Security in Latin America 2022 report, prepared by several United Nations agencies.				

²⁰Cedice Libertad: Venezuela recorded more than 54,000 power outages in January <https://www.elimpulso.com/2025/02/12/cedice-libertad-venezuela-registro-mas-de-54-000-fallas-electricas-en-enero-12feb/>

²¹Restrictions and pollution exacerbate the water crisis <https://transparenciave.org/restricciones-y-contaminacion-agudizan-crisis-del-agua/>

²²IDEM

²³Bulletin 80: Convite reports 28.4% shortage of medicines for six diseases in March 2024 <https://conviteac.org/noticias/notas-de-prensa/boletin-80-284-de-escasez-de-medicamentos-para-seis-enfermedades-registra-convite-en-marzo-2024>

²⁴FEDECÁMARAS Radio. March 2022. Seventy percent of Venezuelans don't consume animal protein because they lack the purchasing power. Available at: <https://fedecamarsradio.com/avaf-el-70-de-los-venezolanos-no-esta-consumido-proteina-animal-porque-no-tiene-el-poder-adquisitivo/>

Specifically, Venezuela is home to at least 6.5 million people suffering from hunger, ranking first in the region for hunger. The impact on children in Venezuela is particularly worrying, as they currently experience high rates of malnutrition.²⁵

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has noted in its latest reports that the lack of safe water is hampering access to food in many communities in Venezuela, affecting 90% of the population, pushing the most vulnerable Venezuelans to the brink of food insecurity.

The existence of a complex humanitarian crisis, which has lasted almost 10 years, has meant a serious deterioration in the agriculture sector and, consequently, in access to food, resulting in an increase in hunger in Venezuela.

The prolonged economic crisis has limited households' ability to purchase basic food, leaving millions of people in the country without access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food.²⁶

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.288 (Brunei Darussalam) Continue to strengthen efforts to ensure that citizens fully enjoy good health, including mental health , and have access to health care and support,				
<u>Justification</u> A study conducted by the organization Provea indicated that by 2022, the country's mental health policy has historically focused on hospitals or psychiatric centers. There are no community-based mental health centers, and hospital services cannot provide long-term care.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.295 (Saudi Arabia) Ensure universal access to health care for all, especially for the most vulnerable communities and groups				
<u>Justification</u> The serious structural collapse of the public health care system continues, as its compromised to its 80% and thus unable to provide services to the				

²⁵Pan American Health Organization. January 2023. Regional Overview of Food and Nutrition Security. Latin America. Available at: <https://www.paho.org/en/documents/regional-overview-food-security-nutrition-latin-america-caribbean-2022>

²⁶Infobae. At least five million people are suffering from hunger in Venezuela. Available at: <https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2025/01/28/al-menos-5-millones-de-personas-sufren-de-hambre-en-venezuela-poder-a-la-crisis-economica-prolongada/>

majority of the population. This is mainly due to the withdrawal of three-quarters of the trained medical and nursing staff, a severe shortage of basic supplies and materials, and a healthcare infrastructure that lacks the necessary conditions to provide free, sufficient, and adequate care to those seeking services, primarily due to a lack of water and electricity. The public health care system has been in a precarious state of deinstitutionalization and underfunding for over a decade. This has not been addressed through state policies and has progressively led to the privatization of access to diagnostic and treatment programs in healthcare centers. As a result, Venezuela is experiencing a significant deterioration in the health of its population, with an increasing number of people with chronic and acute problems who are deprived of the guarantees of their rights. Faced with this serious situation, the Venezuelan government has canceled the publication of official statistics on epidemiological surveillance and service performance, as well as health policies and plans, since 2016.

WOMEN'S RIGHTS

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.83 (Maldives) Adopt a national action plan to address violence against women and ensure that the necessary resources are allocated to implement it. 31.85 (Sweden) Ensure the effective implementation of the Organic Law on Women's Right to a Life Free from Violence in all areas, including by establishing a national action plan to protect women and prevent violence against them. 31.87 (Croatia) Adopt a national action plan to combat sexual and gender-based violence				
Recent reports from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 2023 ²⁷and 2024 ²⁸, have noted the lack of a comprehensive and updated national action plan to combat gender-based violence in the country. This body has recommended that the Venezuelan State develop more effective policies to guarantee the protection of women and girls from violence, specifically, a "national action plan to address gender-based violence in accordance with the observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women." To date, no national action plan to address violence against women or, in general, sexual and gender-based violence with the recommended characteristics has been approved and implemented. In particular, the Human Rights Observatory of the University of Los Andes in alliance with the ULA Women's Commission, considers the case of Naibelys Verónica Noel Pérez to be of special attention, which involves various types of violence against women, including institutional violence due to the use of gender stereotypes in the application of justice ²⁹, which was also considered by the OHCHR ³⁰and demonstrates the lack of effective application of the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence ³¹.				

²⁷Recommendation (e). A/HRC/53/54 (4 July 2023). Available at: https://cepaz.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/A_HRC_53_54-.pdf.

²⁸Recommendation (f). A/HRC/56/63 (June 18–July 12, 2024). Available at: <https://foropenal.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/a-hrc-56-63-unoficiales.pdf>.

²⁹ULA WOMEN (June 2, 2024). "Court of Appeals upheld maximum sentence for Naibelys Noel, victim of vicarious violence." Available at: <https://ulamujer.org/corte-de-apelaciones-ratifico-sentencia-de-pena-maxima-a-naibelys-noel-victima-de-violencia-vicaria/>.

³⁰Paragraph 28. A/HRC/56/63 (June 18–July 12, 2024). Available at: <https://foropenal.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/a-hrc-56-63-unoficiales.pdf>.

³¹ULA WOMEN (December 2023) Report on Vicarious Violence Against Women. Available at: <https://ulamujer.org/informe-violencia-vicaria-contra-las-mujeres/>.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.105 (Fiji) Redouble efforts to address violence against women and children, and against any other person based on their sexual orientation or gender identity, including by taking measures to prevent violence and support survivors, and removing obstacles to access to justice				
<u>Justification</u> Venezuela does not have a public information system with statistics that provide insight into the indicators of violence, and this already indicates a significant institutional weakness. It is impossible to identify or prevent violence due to the lack of up-to-date data to guide public action. Consulting the few and scattered institutional records and reviewing studies conducted by specialized organizations and programs that serve victims reveals a notable increase in the severity of several types of violence, especially against children, adolescents, and women. In particular, a trend is identified as increasing sexual violence against children and adolescents (including cases of commercial sexual exploitation) and cases of cruel treatment against this population, with children 5 years of age and younger being the main victims of cruel treatment and infanticide by immediate family members (REDHNNA, 2024 and 2025). The State's public policy in the face of this violence has been punitive, with criminal sanctions as the sole response, without implementing a prevention plan or program or providing the necessary protection that victims require. The public approach is forensic and exclusively focused on severe criminal sanctions, without addressing the factors that determine the population's vulnerability or the root causes of the problems. Even in cases of school violence, where a restorative and socio-educational approach should be prioritized, the State's actions are centered on the logic of exemplary punishment, with procedures that violate rights and guarantees, impeding the development of educational proposals that promote everyone's commitment to peace, co-responsibility, and respect for human rights.				

RIGHTS OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.272 (Egypt) Continue to take all necessary measures to guarantee the right to food, particularly for children and adolescents				
<u>Justification</u> Food insecurity cannot be overcome without addressing its structural causes. Venezuela has stopped producing basic food and is currently experiencing the effects of a severe devaluation, which has further reduced families' limited ability to provide for themselves, resulting in high rates of malnutrition leading to undernutrition. The CLAP program, which provides food bags, remains irregular and insufficient in its provision, primarily including carbohydrates and fats, with little protein. Additionally, there is no knowledge of children's and adolescents' nutrition requirements being met. This issue deepens with children with disabilities or chronic health conditions. Further, children and adolescents in care facilities do not receive adequate quality and quantity of assistance, neither in cases within the protection system, nor within the juvenile criminal justice system. Specialists warn that the main problem in Venezuela has ceased to be shortages and is now the population's low purchasing power, which is leading families to resort to unusual strategies such as reducing portion sizes and changing the quality and diversity of their food. This situation leads many people to end up suffering from calorie imbalances and malnutrition. They particularly highlight the implications of these malnutrition patterns among pregnant and breastfeeding women and adolescents.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.302 (Indonesia) Take all necessary measures to ensure the effectiveness of the right of all children to education				
<u>Justification</u> The economic, political, and social crisis Venezuela is experiencing with the Complex Humanitarian Emergency has profoundly affected all aspects of the population's lives, and the education system is one of them, revealing significant gaps and challenges.				

The NGO Caleidoscopio Humano managed to record 120 cases in which the right to education was compromised. This decline is influenced by several factors, ranging from precarious teacher salaries, deteriorating school infrastructure, lack of basic services, disrespect for unions, and student dropout rates. Furthermore, there is a lack of official figures regarding school enrollment, spending, and budget for education.³²

During 2023, the Andrés Bello Catholic University revealed data from a study on the deficient performance of high school students in key subjects. This analysis was carried out under the Online Knowledge Assessment System (Secel, for its Spanish name), based on 23,440 diagnostic tests applied to young people from public and private institutions in five states of the country, concluding that students lack minimum skills, including the large learning gap that exists between private schools, compared to public schools, likewise, when the analysis was carried out on mathematical skills, it showed that students do not have the minimum skills in this area.³³ Many of these deficiencies in student learning are linked to the shortage of teaching staff, as a consequence of migration.³⁴ According to the Venezuelan Federation of Teachers, by the end of 2024, nearly 3 billion children were excluded from the school system, and those who remained in the school system received less than 60% of their classes due to poor school conditions and a shortage of teaching staff.

The Ministry for Education reported that five and a half million children and adolescents returned to classrooms with the start of the 2024-2025 school year, at various levels (preschool, elementary, and secondary). The Venezuelan Federation of Teachers states that "almost 3 million children are outside the school system," claiming that this represents a 37% decrease compared to the 2021-2022 school year, according to the Ministry of Education's own figures. This reduction in the number of school enrollments is explained by the forced migration of the population leaving the country due to the inability to guarantee their daily food, and in search of income to improve their living conditions. According to the National Survey of Living Conditions (2023), young people between the ages of 12 and 17 dropped out of school because they have to work, also because they do not find what they are learning useful and consider the education provided to be of inadequate quality. Another factor related to the drastic reduction in school enrollment is "teacher dropout," the abandonment by education professionals of their jobs due to precarious salaries, which in many cases are not enough to cover the costs of the teacher's travel to the place where they teach. According to the Venezuelan Federation for Teachers, for the first time in the country, the country has seen teacher dropout rates due to migration and the need to seek alternative income due to precarious salaries. This dropout rate is occurring nationwide. The education system's payroll is estimated at 487,000 active teachers, and 200,000 have left the education system without a proper replacement. Low teacher salaries and the national executive's lack of response regarding the collective bargaining agreement with public school teachers are identified as the main causes of teacher dropouts.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
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³²Human Kaleidoscope: Decline of Public Services. Available at: <file:///C:/Users/natal/Downloads/Informe-de-Servicios-Publicos-Caleidoscopio-Humano.pdf>

³³The Cocuyo Effect. <https://efectococuyo.com/la-humanidad/sin-competencias-basicas-en-que-coinciden-la-ucaba-y-el-gobierno-sobre-la-educacion-en-venezuela/>

³⁴The Informant. <https://www.elinformadorve.com/05/09/2022/venezuela/with-a-deficit-of-57-specialized-teachers-will-start-the-school-year-2022-2023/>

31.312 (Bahrain) Develop a dedicated institutional framework to strengthen existing efforts to eradicate violence against women and children				
<u>Justification</u> The special national law for the protection of children established the mandate of establishing an inter-institutional system designed to guarantee the rights of children and adolescents and provide them with protection against all forms of violence. However, the decentralized model that promoted joint responsibility between the State, Family, and Society was replaced by a centralized model in which the Vice Ministry of the Presidency of the Republic oversees public performance in the Comprehensive Protection of Children and Adolescents. To date, it is not possible to demonstrate either the fulfillment of its powers or the authorization or mandate to other public entities to fulfill their duties in the area of protection. There is no known plan or policy for the functioning of the institutions responsible for preventing violence or for the proper protection of victims. The performance of the bodies comprising the system has been reduced to a minimum. Most of the Municipal Councils for the Rights of Children and Adolescents and the Protection Funds have ceased to operate, and most of the Ombudsman's Offices, programs, and services have disappeared. A significant loss of institutional capacity regarding children's rights can be observed. The Ombudsman's Office and the Protection Councils that currently exist in the municipalities are working with limited resources, often without equipment or materials. They lack the required number of counselors or multidisciplinary teams, nor do they have programs or services to implement appropriate protection measures in the face of the growing victimization of children and adolescents. Educational authorities are also unaware of specific prevention policies or plans; they have only isolated actions, initiated by individual officials, or reactive interventions in response to an act of violence that generates alarm in the community.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.320 (Singapore) Continue initiatives aimed at improving the education of children and adolescents at all levels				
Teacher union leaders emphasize that the education system is in a state of collapse and the achievement of educational goals cannot be guaranteed because neither students nor teachers have the conditions to ensure their survival. The profound economic crisis the country is experiencing has impacts on all areas of life. Teacher salaries are extremely low; the average teacher receives around \$10 a month, which is not enough to cover even the basic food basket. This precarious job situation has led many teachers to seek alternative income or leave the profession. Teacher attrition continues to rise, and it is estimated that "approximately 250,000 teachers need to be recruited to cover the classrooms of early childhood, primary, and secondary education" (NGO Monitor Descave. Report on Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights). "A teacher shortage is estimated at 40%, according to the Venezuelan Federation of Teachers," the report also highlights, explaining that one of the factors influencing this teacher attrition is the low salaries they receive, the maximum being just the equivalent of US\$12.50. As required by the International				

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, children's education must be of quality, which requires ensuring the presence of professionally trained teachers in the country's schools and high schools, and this requires fair compensation for educators. Above all, the recruitment and retention of specialized teachers in public high schools and high schools depends on this. It is also necessary to address the serious problems of educational infrastructure and ensure that schools have access to basic services (drinking water, electricity, sanitation services), the provision of which is irregular and very deficient in most regions of the country.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.322 (Barbados) Continue developing policies and programs that protect the rights of children and adolescents				
<u>Justification</u> In Venezuela, there are no institutions that develop policies and programs with a focus on children and adolescents' rights. Although, theoretically, a protection system and a juvenile justice system exist, they lack the capacity to fulfill their assigned responsibilities. The presence of humanitarian architecture in the country (OCHA) since 2019 has not materialized progress in this regard, as the opportunities for coordination with authorities are minimal and even nonexistent in some areas. In the case of civil society organizations, the restrictions they face are greater, with the enactment of laws and the implementation of mechanisms that intensify oversight and surveillance of their members and activities, as well as funding problems, persecution, harassment, and censorship.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.323 (Bulgaria) Strengthen institutions and mechanisms for the protection of unaccompanied children and combat all forms of violence, exploitation, and abuse against them.				
<u>Justification</u> Venezuelan society is facing a significant transformation due to the forced migration of millions of people, resulting in family separation, with mothers and fathers emigrating to other countries in search of income, leaving their children in the care of other relatives. In many cases, situations that qualify as family abandonment have been estimated at 800,000 children "left behind," with the resulting consequences for their personal integrity. Authorities in other countries, such as the Colombian Ombudsman, have reported that the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (IF) has a registry of 1,200 Venezuelan children and adolescents who are in Colombia under protection and are undergoing an administrative process to				

restore their rights. These figures, representing a population on the move and separated families, warrant a specific protection strategy by the authorities comprising the National Governing System for the Protection of Children and Adolescents in Venezuela, in accordance with the powers conferred upon them by the National Law for the Protection of this population. However, there is no known statement from any of these authorities acknowledging the magnitude of this problem or reporting on actions taken or yet to be taken to address the specific protection needs of this population. Nor is there any information on prevention plans or actions, approved or implemented, for the protection of children and adolescents who are victims of violence, exploitation, or abuse, due to their vulnerability due to separation from their families.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.324 (Sri Lanka) Strengthen the Specialized Comprehensive Protection Unit to improve the protection of children and adolescents with disabilities				

Justification

In practice, there is only one known public care facility for children and adolescents with disabilities in the Caracas metropolitan area, called "Paquita Giuliani." The facility offers precarious care, severely limited resources, and is overwhelmed by its capacity and ability to provide specialized care to children and adolescents with disabilities. There are not enough such units in the country; in 2018, a neurodevelopment center was located in the Sucre municipality of Miranda state, but it is currently and technically closed. Families with children with autism spectrum disorders, Down syndrome, visual or hearing impairments, cerebral palsy, or other disabilities do not have access to public care facilities; all appropriate care has been privatized. In the case of separated children and adolescents with disabilities, the situation is even more alarming, as there is no trained, well-paid staff, nor a truly multidisciplinary team to address the diverse situations that arise. There are no institutions for intermediate conditions; that is, the only way they can receive some public care is if the condition is serious and extreme. There are no standard mechanisms, programs, and procedures for diagnosing intellectual, cognitive, and psychosocial disabilities in the public sphere, nor for providing guidance to teachers and caregivers. It is urgent to combine child and adolescent protection systems with the health system to provide timely and appropriate care for children and adolescents with disabilities.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31,326 (United Arab Emirates) Continue developing training programs to improve the capacity of teaching staff working with children and adolescents with disabilities , including the awarding of a Venezuelan Sign Language certificate, as				

well as a certificate of full mastery of Braille, orientation, and mobility techniques.				
<u>Justification</u> There is no significant development of sign language in the country, which is handled by very few people and is subdivided into two groups: people who are users because they live with people with hearing disabilities, and those who master sign language based on what they learn in their homes and private settings. On the other hand, there are only five people certified to speak Venezuelan Sign Language (VSL), who are the ones who work when some action is required for the Public Ministry, the Protection Council, and the Courts. It is imperative that more people master VSL. Regarding Braille, little progress is known in the dissemination of this knowledge. There is no information on specialized training programs for teachers in programs and strategies specific to inclusive education, aimed at preventing discrimination and educational failure among people with disabilities and promoting intercultural competencies in educational communities. There is no known public policy or plan for updating or training teachers on inclusive education; however, it is also known that in teacher training institutions there is a very severe reduction in the number of applicants to train as education professionals. Furthermore, a decline in enrollment in education programs is evident. Between 2008 and 2022, "the Schools of Education at the Libertador Experimental Pedagogical University (UPEL), the Central University of Venezuela (UCV), and the UCAB registered a 76% drop in the number of students enrolled in this program.				

PREVENTION OF MODERN SLAVERY AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.239 (Romania) Implement the National Plan against Trafficking in Persons for 2021-2025, thus establishing a comprehensive policy in the field of trafficking in women, children and adolescents and the smuggling of migrants				
<u>Justification</u> There are no known indicators, goals, investments, or officials for the National Plan against Human Trafficking.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.241. (Mexico) Strengthen institutions and policies regarding trafficking in persons and provide comprehensive assistance and protection to victims.				
<u>Justification</u> The Venezuelan State has failed to provide assistance or protection to victims of human trafficking. An example of this is the case documented by FundaRedes of twenty-two migrants from Táchira who disappeared in November 2023 in Mexico. ³⁵ The families of the missing requested assistance from the Venezuelan State, but to no avail. The case of the twenty-two migrants from Táchira is paradigmatic, as it represents a visible example of thousands of unreported cases. The Venezuelan State is not only responsible for the Complex Humanitarian Emergency that is driving the exodus of Venezuelans; the Venezuelan State is responsible for its failure to provide assistance and protection to Venezuelans who are victims of human trafficking.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.242. (Liechtenstein) Establish specialized institutions and policies to document and protect migrants, women,				

³⁵ FundaRedes (2023). Twenty-two migrants from Táchira disappear in Mexico. Relatives demand answers. Available at: <https://www.fundaredes.org/2023/11/08/22-migrantes-tachirenses-desaparecen-en-mexico-familiares-piden-respuestas/>

children, and the most vulnerable who become victims of human trafficking, forced prostitution, and sexual slavery.				
<u>Justification</u> The Venezuelan State has not established specialized institutions or policies to document the cases of migrants, women, children, and victims of human trafficking, forced prostitution, and sexual slavery. On the contrary, the Venezuelan State has caused the Complex Humanitarian Emergency, which, in turn, has motivated the mass exodus of Venezuelans. A large part of the Venezuelan exodus has moved across land borders, leaving them exposed to human trafficking networks, irregular armed groups, and criminal gangs. Furthermore, the Orinoco Mining Arc (hereinafter AMO)—established in 2016 by the Venezuelan State—is an ecosystem of illicit activities, in which women are susceptible to forced prostitution and sexual slavery. The networks of illicit actors practicing extractivism are part of the dispossession of human dignity and geographical areas to become the owners and control of the economy in the hands of AMO. Many of the children and adolescents living in the southern part of the country are victims of child trafficking, as well as labor and social exploitation. Many of them suffer abuse and excessive violence from conception even before birth. They are the products of the sexual assault of their mothers and go on to have a cruel and violent childhood at the hands of their aggressors.³⁶				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.242 (Liechtenstein) Establish specialized institutions and policies to document the cases of migrants, women, children, and the most vulnerable people who become victims of human trafficking, forced prostitution and sexual slavery , and to protect them from these situations.				
<u>Justification</u> Public registries have not been institutionalized to properly document the crimes of kidnapping, sale, sexual exploitation, or human trafficking. Information on these incidents is limited to statements by public officials from law enforcement agencies or the Attorney General of the Republic. However, these are isolated and sporadic reports, and they do not result from information recorded in a statistical system with indicators that allow for the identification of trends, patterns of criminal activity, or risk factors that influence the occurrence of the problem. Not only is this not being fulfilled, but what is also evident is the increase in press reports and unofficial information reporting cases of trafficking of adolescents for commercial sexual exploitation, or the involvement of young people involved in deceptively recruiting adolescents to illegally transport them to other countries for exploitation.				

³⁶ FundaRedes (2024). Environmental Report #9. Children and Adolescents Vulnerable by the Action of Irregular Armed Groups. Available at: <https://www.fundaredes.org/2024/04/12/informeepa-ninos-y-adolescentes-vulnerables-por-accion-de-grupos-armados-irregulares/>

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.243 (Djibouti) Continue efforts to combat trafficking in persons , particularly the sexual exploitation of children and women, by intensifying efforts against those responsible for trafficking in persons				
<u>Justification</u> No progress has been reported regarding human trafficking in the mining belt, in border areas, or anywhere else in the country. The phenomenon continues to persist, although news monitoring occasionally mentions arrests of traffickers by police or military officials and possible prosecutions leading to prison sentences. However, these reports do not reflect the number of victims and/or potential victims that continue to exist in the country. Regarding the sexual exploitation of children and adolescents, we are unaware of any public action to comprehensively address this scourge.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.244 (Congo) Redouble efforts to combat trafficking in persons, especially women and children				
<u>Justification</u> No real efforts have been verified, beyond those already reported in isolated press releases, which have to do with specific arrests of criminals in flagrante delicto or those against whom complaints were filed, to promote actions aimed at preventing this crime and the effective management of cases of victims/survivors.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.244. (Congo) Redouble efforts to combat trafficking in persons, especially women and children.				
<u>Justification</u> The Venezuelan state is failing to fulfill its duty to prevent the operation of human trafficking networks. In fact, according to testimonies collected by FundaRedes , Venezuelan state officials are allegedly immersed in the illicit trade: "The Delta is par excellence the highway for facilitating all these illicit activities by organized gangs that operate in broad daylight under the tutelage of state officials, who are the best facilitators of this activity. In the Delta, even officials lend themselves to facilitating the trafficking of minors. After abusing them, they send them to work in Trinidad, where they are exploited by criminal gangs. They strip them of their documentation and are forced to serve as bait for a massive human trafficking spree. There				

are complacent attitudes on the part of officials who charge \$20 for each of them, which they transport in boats with outboard motors that do not guarantee a minimum level of safety on the high seas."³⁷

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.245. (Angola). Adopt concrete measures to protect women and children from trafficking in persons.				

Justification

The Venezuelan state has not established specialized institutions or policies to document the cases of migrants, women, children, and victims of human trafficking, forced prostitution, and sexual slavery. On the contrary, it has caused a Complex Humanitarian Emergency, which, in turn, has motivated the mass exodus of Venezuelans. A large part of the Venezuelan exodus has moved across land borders, leaving them exposed to human trafficking networks, irregular armed groups, and criminal gangs. Furthermore, the Orinoco Mining Arc—established in 2016 by the Venezuelan state—is an ecosystem of illicit activities, in which women are susceptible to forced prostitution and sexual slavery. The networks of illicit actors practicing extractivism are part of the dispossession of human dignity and geographical areas to become the owners and control of the economy in the AMO. Many of the children and adolescents living in the southern part of the country are victims of child trafficking, as well as labor and social exploitation. Many of them suffer abuse and excessive violence from conception even before birth. They are the products of sexual abuse by their mothers and go on to have a cruel and violent childhood at the hands of their abusers.³⁸

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.245 (Angola) Adopt concrete measures to protect women and children from trafficking in persons				

Justification

No knowledge of specific measures aimed at protecting child and adolescent populations from human trafficking for sexual or labor exploitation.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.247 (Thailand) Intensify efforts to combat trafficking in persons, particularly of women, children, and Venezuelan				

³⁷ FundaRedes (2023). Venezuelan State fails to comply with its duty to prevent the operation of human trafficking networks at the border. Available at: <https://www.fundaredes.org/2023/04/17/boletin43-estado-venezolano-incumple-su-deber-de-impedir-operatividad-de-redes-de-trata-de-personas-en-la-frontera/>

³⁸ FundaRedes (2024). Environmental Report #9. Children and Adolescents Vulnerable by the Action of Irregular Armed Groups. Available at: <https://www.fundaredes.org/2024/04/12/informeepa-ninos-y-adolescentes-vulnerables-por-accion-de-grupos-armados-irregulares/>

migrants, and to effectively implement the National Plan against Trafficking in Persons				
<u>Justification</u> There are no known government actions against trafficking of migrant children. With the recent forced return of migrants from North and Central America, violations of the principle of non-refoulement are presumed, even though government agencies describe them as "voluntary returns." Many of these individuals left the country in extremely precarious conditions and face great risks, fleeing violence, hunger, unemployment, and a lack of basic services. They are now forced to return to the same or worse circumstances that motivated them to emigrate in the first place. There is no evidence of international cooperation that could significantly benefit this highly vulnerable population, as there are no known serious and consistent efforts with Panama, Colombia, Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, or other Latin American countries to protect migrants, potential victims of human trafficking on trails and other irregular transportation routes across borders.				

RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31. 295. (Saudi Arabia) Guarantee the access to universal health care for all, especially for the most vulnerable communities and groups				
<u>Justification</u> The Venezuelan government has implemented Indigenous Health care in some hospitals, providing care specifically for Indigenous people and supported by certified medical personnel assisted by translators. However, there are no statistical data to determine how many health centers in the country have an Indigenous Health unit.				
Recommendation	Fulfills	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.305 (Plurinational State of Bolivia) Continue implementing intercultural schools nationwide to offer bilingual intercultural education to students, taking into account the cultural specificity of each Indigenous people.				
<u>Justification</u> The Venezuelan state lacks statistical data to measure the implementation of intercultural and Indigenous-segregated schools, which are lagging behind the intercultural education guaranteed by the national legal system. In recent years, according to the testimonies of leaders and members of Indigenous communities, there has been evidence of regression in the implementation of intercultural schools among Indigenous peoples. They have expressed concern about the lack of attention to their educational and cultural needs, indicating that the current system does not respect or integrate bilingual intercultural education into most experiences. Some of the reasons and evidence are as follows: 1. Lack of effective public policies: Efforts have been insufficient in terms of educational policies because they have failed to align with the specific needs of each indigenous people, and the lack of an intercultural approach that respects and promotes indigenous languages and cultures has led to an education that does not reflect the reality of the people.				

2. Inequality in resource allocation: Intercultural schools have not received the necessary resources. This includes a lack of adequate teaching materials, poor infrastructure, and a shortage of trained and well-paid teaching staff.
3. Displacement and migration: Indigenous peoples face forced displacement due to mining, natural resource exploitation, and other socioeconomic factors. This has affected the continuity of education and the stability of communities, with several schools going months without attending school.
4. Stigmatization and discrimination: Discrimination against Indigenous peoples can discourage participation in educational systems that do not value their culture. This translates into low enrollment and dropout rates. In some cases, parents, and guardians, faced with the inferior quality of education, choose to enroll their children in schools in neighboring countries such as Brazil and Colombia.
5. Lack of adequate teacher training: Teachers working in these schools are not sufficiently prepared to teach in intercultural contexts, which limits the effectiveness of education.
6. Cultural invisibility: Formal education, in most cases, ignores or minimizes the worldviews, traditions, and ancestral knowledge of Indigenous peoples, which creates a disconnect between the school curriculum and the cultural reality of students.

INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.33 (Australia) Cooperate with international human rights instruments and mechanisms, including by providing support for visits				
During this period, the Venezuelan State has only accepted one visit from one international human rights mechanism (the Right to Food Rapporteur). The cooperation relationship with the OHCHR in Caracas was suspended on February 15, 2024, although it was reestablished months later. Furthermore, the official refusal to allow an on-site visit by the UN Human Rights Council's Fact-Finding Mission remains in place.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.70 (Burundi) Continue to take appropriate measures to strengthen the various institutions responsible for promoting and protecting human rights.				
<u>Justification</u> Between 2022 and 2025, institutions responsible for promoting and protecting human rights, such as the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Courts of the Republic, the Public Defense Office, and the Ombudsman's Office, have continued to deteriorate. In fact, during this period, the Independent Fact-Finding Mission documented how the state apparatus represses civic space and how the justice system collaborates with the commission of crimes against humanity. Likewise, in a public and notorious review by the Human Rights Committee in 2023, several experts warned of the evident lack of independence of the Public Prosecutor's Office. In October 2024, the Ombudsman was appointed for a new term, illegally and unconstitutionally, since both the Constitution (Article 280) and the Organic Law of the Ombudsman's Office (Articles 3 and 17) establish that the head of the Ombudsman's Office can be elected for a "single term" of seven years. As such, Alfredo Ruiz's second term Will not be in compliance the Venezuelan legal system. In March 2025, the Accreditation Subcommittee of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions decided to initiate a special review of the Venezuelan Ombudsman's Office, following allegations from civil society organizations regarding its non-compliance with the Paris Principles.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.76 (Lithuania) Develop and approve a new national human				

rights plan				
<u>Justification</u> Since 2019, there has been no National Human Rights Plan in Venezuela. Nor have any documented attempts or plans to develop one.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.78 (Islamic Republic of Iran) Continue implementing national plans for economic and productive recovery , focusing especially on the most vulnerable sectors of society, thus ensuring the promotion and protection of their fundamental rights.				
Both economic and social indicators do not indicate an improvement in the population's production and consumption levels. On the contrary, HUM Project reports ³⁹ indicate an increase in the larger-scale social emergency given the worsening limitations faced by the most vulnerable population in accessing essential goods and services. In 2023, HUM documented that a greater number of people have been added to the list of those requiring assistance and protection, and those who already had critical or severe needs have fallen into extreme levels of deprivation and harm.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.88 (Malaysia) Continue to implement the National Human Rights Plan for 2016-2019, especially with regard to social protection programs that support women, children, and persons with disabilities.				
<u>Justification</u> The 2016-2019 National Human Rights Plan has expired, and no progress has been made on a new plan. No review has been convened regarding the fulfillment of its goals, nor have opportunities for public participation to monitor the human rights situation of children and adolescents been disseminated. Even if the plan exists, it is not known and has not been implemented. Nor is there any public action by the institutions and authorities responsible for protecting and defending these rights, not even in the face of serious allegations of mass violations of rights, such as the arrests of adolescents in the days following the presidential elections of July 28, 2024; nor in the face of the challenge posed by the migration of families from				

³⁹A project developed by the Civilis organization that generates qualitative and quantitative research on the status of public and social services. See: <https://humvenezuela.com/en/about-us/>

the country, exacerbating the violation of the human rights of vulnerable groups. Pursuant to the Organic Law for the Protection of Children and Adolescents, the approval of a National Plan for the Protection of the Human Rights of Children and Adolescents is mandatory. This plan includes goals, actions, and budget investments to restore violated rights, guarantee the protection required by victims, strengthen and support families, and develop institutional capacities for specialized care for the population. The viability of this plan requires joint and coordinated efforts among the bodies comprising the National Governing System for the Protection of Children and Adolescents, with the participation of social organizations and authorities and institutions at various levels of government.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.91 (Ukraine) Ensure the independence of the national human rights institution and ensure that it achieves the highest accreditation.				

Justification

The Ombudsman's Office, as a national human rights institution, lacks independence. The Ombudsman's Office remains silent in the face of human rights violations occurring in the country, despite constant public denunciations from organized civil society. Furthermore, its institutionality is further undermined by the fact that its head was appointed without following the established constitutional process: the Ombudsman who held office since 2017 did so without being elected.

In a public process, within the Republican Moral Council, the principal organ of Citizen Power. On the contrary, he was appointed by the National Constituent Assembly, which was not empowered to do so; that is, despite being an institution created for and by the citizens, it did not exercise its functions legitimately. In October 2024, the Ombudsman was appointed for a new term, illegally and unconstitutionally, since both the Constitution (Article 280) and the Organic Law of the Ombudsman's Office (Articles 3 and 17) establish that the head of the Ombudsman's Office can be elected for a "single term" of 7 years. Thus, Alfredo Ruiz's second term will take place outside the Venezuelan normative order. In March 2025, the Accreditation Subcommittee of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions decided to initiate a special review of the Venezuelan Ombudsman's Office, following allegations by civil society organizations about its non-compliance with the Paris Principles.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.93 (India) Continue to strengthen the national human rights institution in accordance with the Paris Principles				

Justification

Between 2022 and 2025, the institutions responsible for promoting and protecting human rights have continued to deteriorate. In particular, the Ombudsman's Office fails to respond to citizen requests or intervene judicially, as is its constitutional duty, in response to reports of human rights violations. In October 2024, the Ombudsman was appointed for a new term, illegally and unconstitutionally. Both the Constitution (Article 280) and the Organic Law of the Ombudsman's Office (Articles 3 and 17) establish that the head of the Ombudsman's Office can be elected for a "single term" of seven years. Thus, Alfredo Ruiz's second term will not be in compliance with the Venezuelan legal system. In March 2025, the Accreditation Subcommittee of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions decided to initiate a special review of the Venezuelan Ombudsman's Office, following allegations by civil society organizations about its non-compliance with the Paris Principles.

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.95 (Nepal). Consider implementing measures to achieve the reclassification of the Ombudsman's Office as a Category A institution in accordance with the Paris Principles.				
In 2016, the Ombudsman's Office was downgraded to Category B by the international scrutiny of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions, largely due to its lack of actual and perceived independence, as well as its inability to fully exercise its powers and criticize abuses by the Executive Branch. The institution's Category B status currently remains in place for the same reasons,⁴⁰ and Alfredo Ruiz Angulo is the Ombudsman. In the context of the serious human rights crimes committed during the protests of 2014, 2017, and 2019, the institution's behavior has been characterized by inaction or passivity, as well as a disregard for the reports and recommendations of international human rights institutions that have examined the situation in the country. On the contrary, as the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela stated on September 18, 2023, "the Ombudsman has assumed a public profile defending the government's actions, tending to minimize the human rights problems facing the country"⁴¹. Currently, the institution's behavior is no different, and its reclassification to Category A under the Paris Principles is not possible. In October 2024, the Ombudsman was appointed for a new term, illegally and unconstitutionally. Both the Constitution (Article 280) and the Organic Law of the Ombudsman's Office (Articles 3 and 17) establish that the head of the Ombudsman's Office can be elected for a "single term" of 7 years. Thus, Alfredo Ruiz's second term will be held outside Venezuelan law. In March 2025, the Accreditation Subcommittee of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions decided to initiate a special review of the Venezuelan Ombudsman's Office, following allegations by civil society organizations about its non-compliance with the Paris Principles.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not	In regression

⁴⁰Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI). Accreditations updated until April 18, 2025. Available at: <https://ganhri.org/membership/>

⁴¹A/HRC/54/CRP.8 (18 September 2023), para. 1469. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session54/advance-versions/A_HRC_54_CRP.8_EN_0.pdf

			fulfilled	
31.112 (New Zealand) Return to the negotiating table to continue discussions towards a peaceful, democratic, and negotiated solution to the current crisis				
<u>Justification</u> The recommendation to return to the negotiating table to seek a peaceful, democratic, and negotiated solution to the crisis in Venezuela has been partially fulfilled, but with obvious limitations. After the process was interrupted in 2021, the dialogue table was resumed in Mexico in 2022, allowing progress toward the Barbados Agreement in 2023. This agreement sought to establish electoral guarantees and other conditions for the 2024 presidential elections, with the mediation of international actors such as Norway. However, despite progress in the negotiations, implementation of the agreements has been insufficient, and noncompliance by the government has been a major obstacle. On the other hand, the 2024 Caracas Agreement, signed between the government and minority sectors of the opposition, also reflected the limitations of the process. Although an electoral schedule was agreed upon, the agreement excluded the main opposition parties and lacked the necessary guarantees to ensure the transparency and fairness of the process. This raised questions about the legitimacy of the agreement and the elections scheduled for July 2024. Additionally, repression and harassment of the opposition and civil society continue to be a significant factor hindering the effectiveness of these processes. Opposition leaders and human rights defenders have been subjected to intimidation, arbitrary detention, and harassment, which has hindered their free participation in the negotiations. This environment of repression and control has created an environment that does not favor a peaceful and democratic solution.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.113 (Poland) Resume a substantive dialogue with all Venezuelan stakeholders, with the aim of achieving a peaceful solution to the current crisis				
<u>Justification</u> The recommendation to resume substantive dialogue with all Venezuelan stakeholders to achieve a peaceful solution to the current crisis is on the back burner, primarily due to the lack of representation and inclusion of opposition actors in the dialogue process, as evidenced by the 2024 Caracas Agreement.				

This agreement was signed in February 2024 between Nicolás Maduro's government and minority sectors of the opposition, excluding the Democratic Unitary Platform, an actor that had previously been the counterpart in previous negotiation processes and represents a significant portion of the Venezuelan opposition. The exclusion of this platform, which brings together parties with broad popular support, has generated an environment of mistrust and limited the legitimacy of this dialogue process, as well as the scope of the agreements.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.137 (Bahamas) Publish the national budget to enable public oversight				
<u>Justification</u> Although the Venezuelan State approved and published the public budget for 2025 in December 2024, it does not accurately break down or provide updated information on its execution for citizen oversight. This includes spending on health, education, social protection in general, and child protection and violence prevention.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.229 (Norway) Continue seeking peaceful and inclusive solutions through negotiations for the benefit of the Venezuelan people.				
<u>Justification</u> Between 2022 and 2025, the Venezuelan state continued to arrest, persecute, and commit serious crimes against the opposition or perceived opposition population. In October 2023, the Venezuelan opposition primary elections were held with severe restrictions and widespread criminalization. Similarly, beginning on July 28, the Venezuelan state and its electoral, judicial, and justice institutions have intensified human rights violations, particularly those related to political and electoral participation. On October 17, 2023, the Maduro government and the Unitary Platform signed two provisional agreements in Barbados on "the promotion of political rights and electoral guarantees for all" and "the protection of the vital interests of the Nation." The government failed to comply with most of the provisions contained in the agreements, leading to an uncompetitive election on July 28, 2024, which ended in electoral fraud.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression

31.229 (Norway) Continue seeking peaceful and inclusive solutions through negotiations for the benefit of the Venezuelan people				
<u>Justification</u> The recommendation to continue seeking peaceful and inclusive solutions through negotiations has suffered a serious setback in its implementation due to the persistence of significant obstacles. First, the political context has been characterized by an alarming increase in repression of the opposition, with political figures and human rights defenders, such as Rocío San Miguel, subjected to arbitrary detention and various forms of harassment. This is compounded by severe restrictions on freedom of expression and the systematic intimidation of political actors, both through traditional and digital media. This climate of repression has created a clearly unfavorable environment for the development of a genuine dialogue process, critically hindering the full and equitable participation of all political actors, which has hindered progress toward a negotiated solution. Despite the existence of partial dialogue surrounding the 2024 presidential election process, the lack of follow-up on the agreements reached, as well as the lack of transparency before, during, and after the elections by key institutions such as the National Electoral Council (CNE), has seriously undermined the prospects for an inclusive agreement. Instead of moving toward peaceful solutions, the insufficient implementation of these agreements has led to increased repression, harassment, and arbitrary arrests, fueling fear among the population and exacerbating political polarization. In conclusion, compliance with this recommendation has regressed due to the policies and practices promoted by the Venezuelan government, which have severely restricted the conditions necessary for a peaceful and inclusive solution. This setback highlights the urgent need to strengthen the conditions for genuine dialogue and reconciliation in the country if we are to move toward true peace and stability.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.237 (Yemen). Maintain and consolidate peace, increase opportunities to overcome differences, and promote dialogue and national reconciliation with a view to protecting human rights.				
In the context of the July 28, 2024, presidential election, national authorities launched a wave of repression to indiscriminately criminalize critics of the election results, using both soft and hard lines of repression ⁴². The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has classified the authorities' actions				

⁴²ODHULA (2024). Violations of the right to political participation in Venezuela, with special reference to the Andean region. Available at: <https://www.uladdhh.org.ve/informe-violaciones-al-derecho-de-participacion-politica-en-venezuela-con-especial-referencia-a-la-region-andina/>

aimed at instilling fear and suppressing social protests as "state terrorism" ⁴³ in order to consolidate the regime's power following allegations of electoral fraud.

Similarly, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela concluded that, in the same context, the authorities intensified and accelerated the most severe and violent forms of repression, with the aim of silencing opponents or people perceived as such ⁴⁴. This repression, carried out by both state agents and armed civilians with state consent, persists today and has generated a climate of widespread fear among the population.

Therefore, it is not possible to affirm that the State promotes peace and increases opportunities to overcome differences and foster dialogue and national reconciliation with a view to protecting human rights. On the contrary, the recent behavior of national authorities implies a situation of regression in terms of human rights, especially those that make democracy possible, such as participation in public affairs, non-discrimination, freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly.

⁴³Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2025). Serious Human Rights Violations in the Electoral Context, para. 34. Available at: <https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/informes/pdfs/2025/informe-venezuela-graves-violacionesddhh-contexto-electoral.pdf>

⁴⁴A/HRC/57/CRP.5 (14 October 2024), para. 864. Available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session57/advance-versions/a-hrc-57-crp-5-es.pdf>

RIGHTS OF THE LGTBIQ+ COMMUNITY

Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially Fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.104 (Cuba). Continue implementing public policies to guarantee gender equality and rights of LGBTIQ+ communities				
<u>Justification</u> Currently, there are no documented public policies aimed at guaranteeing the rights of LGBTIQ+ communities. On the contrary, more than forty-five cases of hate speech based on prejudices about gender diversity have been documented, issued by state officials from the President, the Attorney General, and representatives, as well as elected officials at the regional and municipal levels, without any measures to address or prevent them. There is no public information about the justice process in cases of violent deaths of trans people, and requests for information to the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Ombudsman's Office remain unanswered.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially Fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.175 (Ukraine). Provide a democratic environment conducive to the activities of the political opposition, journalists, and human rights defenders				
<u>Justification</u> Overall, recent policies have contributed to an increasingly hostile environment for the exercise of civil and political rights in Venezuela. The criminalization of the work of human rights defenders has been increasing, with a particularly severe impact on women and LGBTIQ+ communities, due to the vulnerable and precarious conditions they already faced. This situation has been exacerbated by systematic persecution, stigmatization, and harassment. To date, at least six cases of LGBTIQ+ activists forced into exile due to threats and acts of persecution have been documented.				
Recommendation	Fulfilled	Partially Fulfilled	Not fulfilled	In regression
31.195 (Iceland). Prevent all forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression and sexual characteristics				

Justification: There are no public policies or state programs aimed at preventing discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, or sexual characteristics in Venezuela. The country lacks an adequate regulatory framework to address these forms of discrimination and, on the contrary, multiple cases of violence and exclusion have been documented in recent years that have received no institutional response from any state entity. Although Article 21 of the Organic Labor Law prohibits discrimination in the workplace, this provision lacks specific regulations or effective enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore, the relevant institutions lack specialized training to handle these types of cases, leaving LGBTIQ+ people in a situation of structural vulnerability.